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# Editorial Board

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# Editors' Note

This volume of the *Review of Peacebuilding Studies* contains three articles, each of which is based on a case study of a relevant country: Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Kenya. Peacebuilding cannot be successful without bottom-up efforts and engagement in the processes by local people, organizations and communities. In this sense, the articles provide valuable research and insights into the implications for local peacebuilding processes. It should be noted that the article by Yoshiko Ogawa was originally submitted in 2013. The editors deeply appreciate the authors' patience and cooperation with the refereeing and editing processes and we welcome the thought-provoking manuscripts submitted by a wide range of researchers and practitioners.

# Human Rights Discourse and the Politics of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims: Experimental Comparison between Japan and Rwanda

## Rina Komiya[1]

## 1. Introduction

Recent years have seen an increased societal appropriation of the language of human rights. As it is based on the sad memory of genocide and the moral imperative of "never again," among the various activities of the human rights movement, victim protection is considered the central part of this movement. In other words, "[t]he human rights movement now champions the rights and stories of victims as never before".[2] As such, in this world where human rights are recognized as the common language of humanity, the status of victims has become significant.

At the same time, as Pierre Nora describes, this is "the age of commemoration".[3] Nowadays, commemorative practices in the memory of victims can be seen in everyday life, such as school trips to memorial sights, songs, television dramas, and movies. Influenced by this tendency of the post-modern era, research into commemorative practices has grown recently and has become an international phenomenon.

Even though there is a prevalent argument that commemoration of victims is absolutely necessary for peacebuilding, it is possible that the victim championship of the modern world may hamper sustainable and inclusive peacebuilding since victimhood often used as a tool to escape from the past atrocities that victims themselves committed. While the study of victim narratives of human rights discourse and commemoration in memory of the victims has a large and multilayered field of study from philosophy to politics on its own, it is hard to find a presentation in current literature of how these two are intertwined and affect peacebuilding.

In order to examine the connection between victim championship and peacebuilding, first I will review the victim narratives of the human rights discourse and their consequences. Following the argument regarding the substance of commemoration, I will contest that the commemoration in memory of victims reinforces the image of victim-based human rights discourse and serves as a political means to bring immunity from responsibility for the past atrocities committed by victims, thus it may hamper the sustainable and inclusive peacebuilding. In order to prove this, I will examine the cases of Japan, which commemorates the atomic bombing of Hiroshima during World War II, and Rwanda, which commemorates the 1994 tribal genocide. These cases were chosen based on the reason that commemorations tragic in 20th century.

## 2. Victim Narratives of Human Rights Discourse and the Consequences

Firstly, I will examine the nature of victim narratives of human rights discourse by stating that it is

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[1] Former Associate Protection Officer (UNV), UNHCR Tanzania Kasulu Field Office. This was prepared by Rina Komiya in her personal capacity. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the view of UNHCR Tanzania Kasulu field office.
[2] Conor Gearty, *Can Human Rights Survive?* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.183
[3] Barbara A. Misztal, *Theory of Social Remembering*, (Maidenhead, PA: Open University Press, 2003), p.127

based on 1) stigmatization based on essentialism, 2) a good-bad dichotomy, and 3) a high level of authority. After that, I will assert that the nature of victim narratives of human rights discourse brings immunity of the responsibilities for the past atrocities committed by victims.

## 2.1 The Nature of Human Rights Discourse Regarding Victimhood

### 2.1.1 Stigmatization based on Essentialism

Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was produced in 1948, the legalization of human rights, which pursues human rights objectives through legal mechanisms, has been "central to most national and international efforts to implement human rights".[4] Although the concept of human rights encompasses several dimensions other than the legal aspect, such as the political and moral dimensions, the legalization of human rights has elevated legal mechanisms over moralization in the name of successful and practical enforceability.[5]

However, this legal aspect of human rights discourse contributes to the essentialistic notion of human rights. This is because, in order for the law to be applied in real situations, it is necessary to create a definition of the identities of rights-holders on the basis of which rights can be claimed.[6] As a result of this feature, as Cohen argues, differentiation and classification based on knowledge and information that is carefully collected and analyzed by experts and professionals play a crucial role in the process of legalization.[7] For example, Turkel states, "legality and associated techniques of knowledge and control expand to define and to provide empirical knowledge of every aspect, every fabric of society".[8]

As the process of creating definitions is based on the "twentieth-century enterprise of scientific testing",[9] once a definition has been created, it is difficult to change. Even though the identity of people who claim rights may differ, depending on the time and place, "law reflects a logic of literacy, of the historical achieve rather than of changing collective memory".[10] Thus, legislation brings an end to the openness of the society and fixes the identity of subjects based on essences, which are seemingly fixed and timeless. Therefore, essentialism has inherent dangers.

In addition to the essentialism caused by the legalization of human rights, the language of the human rights reports repeatedly describe victims as sympathetic innocents, perpetrators as deviant, and human rights professionals as heroic, in order to mobilize public outrage.[11] Thus, while human rights professionals such as the UN and NGOs are considered as "the good angel who protests, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards", a basic characteristic of the victim is passive, powerless, and innocent—unable to defend themselves.[12] Such victims are constructed as passive objects of pity and innocence, who were rendered dependent and subject to external interventions.[13]

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[4] Jack Donnely, 'The Virtues of Legalization', in Meckled-García, S. & Çali, B. (eds.), *The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human Rights Law* (Abingdon: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2009), p.67

[5] Gearty, *Can Human Rights Survive?*, p.183

[6] David Kennedy, *The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004)

[7] Stanly Cohen, *Vision of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985)

[8] Gerald Turkel, 'Michel Foucault: Law, Power, and Knowledge', *Journal of Law and Society*, 17 (1990), p.170

[9] Cohen, *Vision of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification*, p.192

[10] Beth A. Conklin, 'Body Paint, Feathers, and VCRs: Aesthetics and Authenticity in Amazonian Activism', *American Ethnologist*, 24 (1997), pp.329, 711-737

[11] Makau Mutua, *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002)

[12] Mutua, *Human Rights*, p.11

[13] Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham, 'Victims', in Marks, S. and Clapham, A. (eds). *International Human Rights Lexicon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.399-410

Coulter also argues that "the notion of victim has been appropriated by humanitarian agencies and quantitative conflict analyses in such a way as to make 'victim' synonymous with lack of agency, and so as such, the notion conceals, albeit unintentionally, other roles these victims might have played and how they have been interpreted by their local community".[14] The "objects of pity and compassion," which denies the victim's capacity for action and reinforces the essentialistic image of victims.[15]

As such, because of the legalization of human rights, which seeks definition of legal subject and the mobilization tactics of the human rights movement, stigmatization based on essentialism can be seen as one of the natures of victim narratives of the human rights discourse.

### 2.1.2 Dichotomy

Victim narratives of the human rights discourse feature a dichotomy between victim and perpetrator. Based on the common sense that there is a difference in the world between suffering an atrocity and committing it, the two groups, victims and perpetrators, tend to be talked about as if they were two completely separated and homogeneous groups of people.[16] As Enns argues, "[t]his is the political world of the victim and the perpetrator, the Hutu and the Tutsi, the Palestinian and the Israeli".[17]

This simplistic image is often promoted and fixed by having been institutionalized through the process of human rights institutions. For instance, in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), "official victims" and "official perpetrators" are artificially generated, regardless of people's identities, because institutions are completely separated between those for perpetrators and those for victims based on a highly-technical legalized process; people were required to decide their identity according to the category that TRC insists.[18]

However, even though we cannot find anything in this broad definition to suggest that a victim can also be a perpetrator, the real situation is more complicated. As Enns argues, victims can become perpetrators, and can in turn be re-victimized again, or victims can be perpetrators simultaneously.[19] Thus in real situations, perpetrators can claim their identity as victims and vice versa. This situation can be also observed from the testimony of one female soldier who was labeled as victim in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia.

> "I was about to go to town, when suddenly doormen appeared before us holding guns and knives in their hands. They said they were RUF from Kailahun…after a month we were taken to Kailahun to be trained. Now I am a victim, a witness and a perpetrator."[20]

As such, although people's identity is more complicated, victim narratives of human rights discourse fails in understating the gravity of such a situation. Even TRC, which aimed to animate human rights legalism and offered a restorative justice as an alternative, only generates the lists of official victims

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[14] Chris Coulter, *Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women's Lives Through War and Peace in Sierra Leone* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), p.153
[15] Marks and Clapham, 'Victims', pp.399-410
[16] Julien Bonder, 'On Memory: Trauma, Public Space, Monuments, and Memorials', *Places*, 21 (1989), pp.62-69.; R Meister, 'Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood', *Ethics & International Affairs*, 16 (2002), pp.91–108
[17] Diane Enns, 'Identity and Victimhood: Questions for Conflict Management Practice', *Berghof Occasional Paper No. 28* (May 2007), p.1. Available at: http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/ Occasional_Papers/boc28e.pdf. (accessed 2017/04/20)
[18] Enns, 'Identity and Victimhood', p.1
[19] Enns, 'Identity and Victimhood', p.1
[20] TRC, 2004 in Chris Coulter, *Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women's Lives Through War and Peace in Sierra Leone* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), p.151

and official perpetrators and do not allow people to claim their complicated identity.

### 2.1.3 Authoritarian Attitudes

Lastly, as a third nature of human rights discourse on victim, I will contest that it entails a high level of authority. Human rights laws are different from other forms of law in the sense that there is a moral intention behind it. Therefore, the level of authority achieved by human rights law is higher than that of ordinary law.[21]  In addition, as the law itself appears neutral and impartial, people believe that the interpretation and judgement of lawyers and judges is more legitimate than that of politicians.[22]  As Goldstein states, "[s]ome actors favors law not only because it serves their interests but also because they believe decisions taken according to legal precepts are superior to other forms of governance".[23]

Thus, once people are recognized and acknowledged as victims based on human rights discourse, to question their authenticity would be a taboo.

### 2.2 Consequences of the Victim Narratives of Human Rights Discourse

Due to the nature of victim narratives of human rights discourse, once people are considered victims based on the human rights discourse, the victim will be stigmatized based on the essentialistic notion of victim and remains forever a "pure innocent victim" over the generations. Nobody will question if they are actually victims or if there is any room of them to be considered as perpetrators at the same time. Thus, with such "victim's license," endowed with a moral authority, victims will enjoy permanent blamelessness.[24]  As Lamb argues, the current overemphasis on victimization and the concomitant over purification of victims have actually been helpful for people who are looking to escape responsibility because perpetrators who were once acknowledged as victims themselves can escape blame with moral authority.[25]

As Appiah notes, this tendency can be observed more often in the case of future generations.[26]  This is because the sentimental solidarity of remembered victimhood makes it possible for new generations who fear losing their identity to keep the publicly-acknowledged identity as victim. In other word, without the identity of the victim based on the experiences of past generations, new generations cannot make sense of themselves.

As such, because of the clear dichotomy of victims/perpetrators based on the essentialism and the moral authority behind the human rights discourse, those once permitted to remain comfortably inside the category of victims can enjoy the environment of immunity even if they have committed atrocities.

### 3. Politics of Commemoration

The nature of commemoration entails 1) essentialism to create 'official' narrative of past event, and 2) exclusiveness while making a collective identity. In this section, I will contest that the commemoration is used as a political means to achieve government's goal.

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[21]  Gearty, *Can Human Rights Survive?*
[22]  David Kennedy, *The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004)
[23]  Judith Goldstein, 'Introduction: legalization and world politics', *International Organization*, 54 (2000), pp.385-399
[24]  Marks and Clapham, 'Victims', pp.399-410
[25]  Sharon Lamb, *The Trouble With Blame: Victims, Perpetrators, and Responsibility.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996)
[26]  Kwame Anthony Appiah, 'The Multiculturalist Misunderstanding', *New York Review of Books*, 44 (1997), pp.30-36

### 3.1 The Nature of Commemoration

According to Bonder, commemoration means "something that serves to preserve memory or knowledge of an individual or event."[27] Although commemoration has a ritual aspect, the same as other kinds of ceremonies, it is distinguishable from all other rituals by the fact that they explicitly refer to prototypical persons and events.[28] Here, I will examine the nature of commemorations.

#### 3.1.1 Essentialism

Firstly, to have a ritual ceremony at the national level, there is a necessity to have a single, official narrative about the past. Therefore, as a first step, states must pick up some memories and essentialize the subjects of the events for the rationalization and conventionalization of the events. Thus, information about the events, such as the date and the actors, the incidents during the events become fixed. For instance, as Wodak and De Cilla state, "[n]ot only are the victims lumped together into one quasi-homogeneous group; all the horror and destruction due to the war and war crimes are also placed into one category – everything was terrible, without differentiating between the events and who caused them."[29]

Along with essentialization of the events, commemorations ignore the narratives that do not suit the category that the commemorations want to provide. The dominant narrative obtains power by connecting with and articulating particular popular conceptions through commemorative ceremonies and popular cultures, whilst actively silencing or marginalizing others.[30] Thus, commemoration "allow[s] for the fabrication, rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often pushing aside accuracy and authenticity."[31]

Even though the reality of the event is much more complicated, by essentializing and selecting narratives, commemoration colonizes discourses and creates an official narrative. Consequently, by repeating mnemonic representations of a certain narrative in rituals, commemoration of the past reshapes the collective memory of people.[32]

#### 3.1.2 Exclusiveness

As remembering past events based on a national narrative tells us how to interpret the past event correctly, commemoration plays an important role in affecting the way people understand their sense of belonging. In Saito's words, "[c]ollective memory is part and parcel of collective identity because memory is a precondition for narrative construction of autobiographies by which we identify who we are."[33] Thus, by reaping the practice bound up with rituals of national identification in commemorations, commemoration brings the notion of "group boundedness and homogeneity, and an emotional essence of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt solidarity with

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[27] Julian Bonder, 'On Memory: Trauma, Public Space, Monuments, and Memorials', *Places*, 21 (1989), pp.62-69
[28] Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1989)
[29] Ruth Wodak and Rudolf De Cilla, 'Commemorating the Past: the Discursive Construction of Official Narratives About the Rebirth of the Second Austrian Republic', *Discourse & Communication*, 1 (2007), p.323
[30] Timothy G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, 'The Politics of War, Memory and Commemoration: Contexts, Structures and Dynamics', in Ashplant, T. G. et al. (eds.), *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp.3-86
[31] Igor Zelizer, 'Russian and American National Identity, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations', *International Politics*, 39 (1998), pp.3, 447-465
[32] Jeffrey K. Olick, 'Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany', *American Sociological Review*, 64 (1999), pp.381-402
[33] Hiro Saito, 'Reiterated Commemoration: Hiroshima as National Trauma', *Sociological Theory*, 24 (2006), p.353

fellow group members and a felt difference from outsiders."[34]  Therefore, as Pennebaker and Banasik state, "these new collectively defined historical memories help to provide identities for succeeding generations."[35]  Thus, this process of creating collective identity provides social cohesion.

However, in the process of selecting memory to be commemorated, people who suffered from the atrocities but do not fit in the category of victims in the collective memory are left behind. The essentialistic image of victim is reinforced by the commemorations over generations as a part of collective memories and thus, as Yoneyama argues, any attempt to challenge or blur the image of victims set throughout commemorations provokes conflict and entails pain and brutality.[36]  As such, alongside the social cohesion based on victimhood, commemoration entails exclusiveness for people who do share the same memory as the majority.

In this section, I have argued the nature of commemorations by stating it entails both essentialism and exclusiveness.

## 3.2 Commemoration as a Political Tool

According to Olick, commemoration is an ongoing, non-fixed dynamic process involving social and political contexts.[37]  Therefore, in his article, *Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany*, he examines how the content of commemoration has changed based on social and political contexts of the present.[38]  He states, "[i]t is the inextricable interplay of past and present, discursive history and contemporary context … that produces images of the past and reactions to those images."[39]  Thus, from this point of view, commemoration, which only deals with specific issues, days, and places, is based on the political tactics of the present. In the same token, Finkelstein argues that commemoration has a function of making the past into a kind of 'mystery religion' and makes it serve some specific interest while holding inner contradictions.[40]

From this perspective, memories are "ideological constructs of vested interests", which are altered for instrumental reasons of the present regime.[41]  As Ashplant *et al.* claim, "wherever people undertake the tasks of mourning and reparation, a politics is always at work."[42]

## 4. Interlinked Victim Narratives and Commemorations

In this section, by bridging the previous arguments on 1) victim narratives of the human rights discourse and 2) the commemoration, I will contest that the commemoration based on victim narratives

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[34] Barbara A. Misztal, *Theory of Social Remembering* (Maidenhead, PA: Open University Press, 2003), p.133
[35] James W. Pennebaker and Betsy L. Banasik, *Collective Memory of Political Events* (Mahwah: Erlbaum, 1997), p.18
[36] Lisa Yoneyama, 'Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity', *Public Culture*, 7 (1995), pp.499-527
[37] Olick, 'Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany', pp.381-402
[38] Olick, 'Genre Memories and Memory Genres', pp.381-402
[39] Olick, 'Genre Memories and Memory Genres', p.399
[40] Norman Finkelstein, 'How the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 Gave Birth to a Memorial Industry', *London Review of Books,* 22 (2007), pp.33-36
[41] Finkelstein, 'How the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 Gave Birth to a Memorial Industry', p.5.
[42] Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, M. 'The politics of war memory and commemoration: contexts, structures and dynamics' in Ashplant, T. G. et al. (eds.) *The politics of war memory and commemoration* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.9

actually serves as a political tool to reinforce the victimhood and escape from the responsibilities of the past atrocities. In order to argue this, I will refer the cases of Japan and Rwanda.

### 4.1. Commemoration and Identity as Victims of the War: In the Case of Japan

On Monday, August 6, 1945, the Allied forces dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, directly killing more than 100,000 people and injuring hundreds more. This tragedy of Hiroshima left a dark shadow after the war because a significant genetically-based radiation effect caused diseases, even after several generations. Thus, since the end of World War II, Japan has been holding commemorations in Hiroshima on August 6 every year and everyone, from right-wing to left-wing, has repeatedly stated that Japan is "the only nation ever to have been atomic-bombed."[43] Now atomic bomb victimhood is ritualized in school trips to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in minutes of silence on August 6 every year, television dramas, and movies about the suffering of victims. Through these commemorations, Japanese people's feelings about 'Hiroshima' were redefined and reinforced, and victim consciences of the atomic bomb have been a central component of Japanese pacifist national identity.[44] At the same time, a bomb survivor was elevated to the status of a "totem", the most sacred representation of the unity of the Japanese nation as a victim of the war.

This social cohesion based on victimhood identity and the sense of duty of 'never again' brought an anti-atomic bomb peace movement at the national level. For instance, Japan declared three nonnuclear principles of not possessing, not producing, and not allowing nuclear arms on its soil, and also enacted Article 9 of its constitution, which prohibits maintenance of armed forces. As a consequence, Japan became an internationally recognized 'peace-loving country.' As Dover states, "[n]uclear victimization spawned new forms of nationalism in post war Japan, a neo nationalism that coexists in complex ways with antimilitarism and even the one-country pacifism."[45] As a state of tragedy, Japan is now reborn as a peace-loving nation.

However, others suggest that the Japanese government utilizes commemoration based on victimhood to escape from the responsibilities of past atrocities committed by the former regime.

In the case of Japan, the strong victimhood consciousness, which is reinforced by commemorations over generations, discounts the victimhood of victims oversea.[46] The most prominent genre of victimhood in the World War II in Japan is that of Japanese who suffered from the atomic bomb and other kinds of victim identity such as Chinese, Korean, Philippines and other victims of the Japanese military were not commonly perceived. As noted earlier, even the reality is more complicated, due to the essentialistic nature of both human rights discourse, once Japan has deemed to be a victim, it is difficult to claim other kind of identity. By holding commemorations of past trauma and claiming its role of victim with Japan's great symbolic capital in the arena of international relations, the Japanese government can tell that the current regime is different from the past regime who committed atrocities. Consequently, holding the commemoration and stressing the victimhood became a way of forgetting Nanjing, Bataan, the Burma-Siam railway, Manila, and the countless Japanese atrocities these and other places.[47]

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[43] James Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai's Press, 2001), p.1

[44] Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan,* p.1.; Saito, 'Reiterated Commemoration: Hiroshima as National Trauma', p.353

[45] John W. Dover, 'The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory', in Hogan, M. J. (eds.), *Hiroshima in History and Memory* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1996), pp.123-124

[46] Saito, 'Reiterated Commemoration: Hiroshima as National Trauma', p.353

[47] Dover, 'The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory', pp.123-124

Even those who recognized the atrocities committed by the Japanese government rate atomic bombings as the "worst sin committed in the twentieth century" and thus assert the ascendance of the bombings over other atrocities committed by the Japanese government, in an imagined hierarchy of state-sponsored evils, marking Japan as the ultimate victim.[48]

Moreover, with the "victim's license" with a moral authority and permanent blamelessness over generations, as Lisa Yoneyama writes, "the Japanese do not remember themselves as aggressors and only remember their victimization in the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has become almost a cliché."[49] As a result, the victimhood of Japan, reinforced by the commemoration since 1950s, covers the responsibility of past aggression.

 In this section, by referring the case of Japan, I have argued that the commemoration of Hiroshima, which reinforces the essentialistic image of victim, serves as a political tool for Japan to enjoy the immunity from the past atrocities. In the next section, I will address the case of Rwanda.

**4.2 Commemoration and Identity as Victims of Genocide: In the Case of Rwanda**

In Rwanda, within only a hundred days between April and July 1994, an estimated 800,000 to 850,000 Rwandans were killed, constituting as much as 20% of the country's total population and 70% of the Tutsi then living in Rwanda.[50]  Most of the victims of genocide were Tutsi, but Hutu were persecuted and killed as well.

The genocide is still remembered in memorials, testimonies, speeches, novels, plays, and films and every year in April, Rwanda commemorates the 1994 genocide with a national week of mourning to mark the first killings in April. Ceremonies are held at memorials and gravesides across the country and the defiant promise 'Never again' can be heard and seen all over the country.

The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)-led government and President Kagame developed a policy of 'national unity and reconciliation' to 'heal' and 'unify' started commemorations from 1995 onwards. Although the government explains the aim of commemoration is to contribute to 'national unity and reconciliation', critics suggest that commemorations serve to construct the moral legitimacy of the RPF regime under "genocide credit," to justify its policies and to defend it against its critics.[51]

Although it is widely contested that there are victims who lost their loved ones due to the crimes committed by RPF soldiers, their memory are officially excluded from genocide commemorations.[52] The most prominent genre of victimhood in post-genocide Rwanda is that of Tutsi survivors who support the RPF's policies and other kinds of identity such as Hutu victims of revenge atrocities committed by Tutsi were not included. Thus, this selective victimhood has reinforced the stereotype of Tutsi as victims and Hutu as perpetrators.

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[48]  Mindy Haverson, 'Memory and Memorial: How the Hiroshima Bombing and Its Korean Victims Have Shaped and Challenged Postwar Japanese Identity', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs* (2010), pp.69-80
[49]  Yoneyama, 'Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity', p.500
[50]  Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.283
[51]  Anne-Marie Brandstetter, 'Contested Pasts: The Politics of Remembrance in Post-Genocide Rwanda', (Antwerp: Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Ortelius Lecture 6, 1 April 2010), pp.3-22; Rachel Ibreck, 'A Time of Mourning: the Politics of Commemorating the Tutsi Genocide in Rwanda', in Lee, Philip, and Thomas, Pradip Ninan (eds.), *Public memory, Public Media and the Politics of Justice* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2012), pp.98-120
[52]  Brandstetter, 'Contested Pasts: The Politics of Remembrance in Post-Genocide Rwanda', pp.3-22

Addition to this, although the commemorations did not directly promote the idea of Tutsi victimhood and Hutu responsibility due to the constitutional ban on references to ethnicity, in 2008, the Parliament supported a legal amendment to references to "Rwandan genocide" and renamed it the "Tutsi genocide" or "genocide against the Tutsis" in the constitution and in commemorations. This clearly reinforced the essentialistic image based on the dichotomy of "Tutsi / victim / innocent" and "Hutu / perpetrators / responsible for the crime," also the boundary is clearly more blurred. Moreover, the Rwandan government has been successful not only in reinforcing the image of victim as innocent and but also in diverting the attentions of international communities to criticize RPF by frequently blaming the international communities for not intervene to stop genocide in 1994. [53] Consequently, commemorations contribute to legitimize RPF government by forgetting the atrocities committed by them.

Accompanied with the moral authority of being victims, the RPF government highly critiqued the international community that sought the responsibilities of RPF by stating "some people claim that the Government is trading in genocide for political gains. Those who say so probably need to have genocide in their own countries so that they too can enjoy those profits."[54] Now Rwanda government has become powerful as it has such "victim's license," which will bring permeant blamelessness.

Because of the nature of human rights discourse over victims as stated in the previous section, once that image of "Tutsi as victims" is set, it is reinforced over and over through commemorations and used as a tool to escaped from the past atrocities committed by victims.

## 4.3 Implications for Peacebuilding

Making space for people to share their experiences of violence and to have those experiences publicly acknowledged throughout commemoration by their own governments can be important parts of reconciliation and (re)building peace. However, selecting which memories of violence to include and which to exclude is a political process that has important implications for the success of peacebuilding.

Even the boundaries shaping the discourse of authentic victims, which exclude groups of people who do not fit the essentic category of victim, are invisible to most people, for the people who are excluded, the boundary walls reveal themselves with clear force and violence.[55] Thus, failing to acknowledge important memories through commemoration based on a political choice may hinder meaningful peacebuilding.

In case of Japan, the strong sense of "Japan as a victim of the War" enforced by commemoration has hindered reconciliation and peacebuilding among neighboring countries in two ways; 1) by being immune from the past atrocities and 2) by excluding atomic bomb victims of different nationality.

As stated earlier, the commemoration in memory of victims reinforces the image of victim-based human rights discourse and serves as a political means to bring immunity from responsibility for the past atrocities committed by victims. For example, Japan's individual compensation policy is

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[53] In 2001, President Kagame accused the failure of the international community to intervene by stating that interniatonl community did nothing although the genocide occurred before the very eyes of the world. Also, in 2004, when the French were singled out for condemnation, Kagame stated that they deliberately designed a strategy to protect the killers, not to save the victims.

[54] Kagame 2008, in Rachel Ibreck, 'A Time of Mourning: The Politics of Commemorating the Tutsi Genocide in Rwanda', pp.98-120

[55] Yoneyama, 'Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity', pp.499-527

significantly different from Germany where payments to victims and their heirs had exceeded $89 billion since 1952.[56] Additional to national compensation, the German government and several German companies set up the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and Future" in 2010 for individual humanitarian payments to be made to former slave and forced laborers and other victims of the Nazi government.[57] Nowadays we can visit the Holocaust Memorial and the Jewish Museum in Berlin but there are no nationally sponsored museums or monuments that acknowledge Japanese aggression or atrocities. This attitude of Japan hinders reconciliation and peacebuilding among Asian countries, even though Official Development Aid of Japan under the name of economic cooperation can be viewed as a carrot to keep this issue closed.

As for the second account, the strong victimhood of "Japan as a victim of the War" also excludes the Korean victims of the Atomic bomb in Hiroshima who had been forcibly sent to Japan as mobilized workers and doubly victimized as a result of the U.S. nuclear attack. Although it is said there are at least 30,000 Korean victims, until 1990, the speeches of political elites at the annual municipal Peace Memorial Ceremony on August 6th never referred to them.[58] Because the Korean victims do not fit in the image of "Japan as a victim," they had been neglected for decades in tragic circumstances without receiving appropriate remedies by the Japanese government.[59] As it can be seen from the fact that there were some arsonists attacks to the Korean atom bomb memorial caused by the relocation plan of the memorial within the Hiroshima Park, there was a high tension between Japanese people who do not want to stain their identity as "Japanese as pure victims" and the Korean victims who are left behind in the victim category. As such, same as the victims of "comfort women," the victims of the Atomic bomb has been an issue between the Japanese government and the Korean government. Thus, commemoration based on the essentialistic notion of victimhood is likely to hinder reconciliation between Japan and Korea.

In the case of Rwanda, due to the strong sense of victimhood of Tutsi in order to legitimate the RPF regime, memories that do not suit the official narratives have been oppressed. Consequently, the failure of the government to acknowledge victims of RPF atrocities provokes feelings of injustice and grievances among. Ibreck notes that sense of injustice is especially acute in Kibeho, where an RPF massacre on 22 April 1995 took place, as RPF does not recognized the fact.[60] As bereaved relatives have no opportunity to vent their feelings publicly, they perceive commemoration as marginalizing their experiences. Ibreck also argues that some even refuse to participate in the genocide commemorations arguing that the others who died should also be remembered in the same way.[61] Although there has been no actual violence so far over the commemorations, we can observe that there is an always tension behind the commemoration due to its oversimplified selective sense of victimhood which excludes certain groups of people.[62]

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[56] Eddy, "For 60th Year, Germany Honors Duty to Pay Holocaust Victims", 17 November 2012, New York Times, Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/world/europe/for-60th-year-germany-honors-duty-to-pay-holocaust-victims.html (accessed 2017/04/20)

[57] Although Japan does not have such Fund, dozens of wartime compensation suits had been filed in Japan against the Japanese government and companies associated with the wartime aggression during World War II. Almost all have been rejected by Japanese courts. However in 2015, for the first time, Japanese construction company Mitsubishi Materials Corp apologized and paid compensation to Chinese people over its use of forced labor during World War II.

[58] Yoneyama, 'Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity', pp.499-527

[59] Yoneyama, 'Memory Matters', p.499-527

[60] Ibreck, 'A Time of Mourning', pp.98-120

[61] Ibreck, 'A Time of Mourning', pp.98-120

[62] Examples of tension includes a man who dressed his dog in purple scarves, telling people he was in mourning for the "dogs that 'perished' during the genocide" (*The New Times*, 11 April 2007) and a person who called local radio station during a commemoration program of genocide and warned listeners that "we shall kill you again" (*The New Times*, 19 April 2006)

Thus, this exclusion of many Rwandans' memories in the commemoration based on the essentialistic notion of victimhood is not only served as a political tool to escape from the responsibilities of the past atrocities but also likely to hinder reconciliation, justice, and democracy and undermines durable peace.

## 5. Conclusion

In this essay, I have illustrated the relationship between victim narratives of the human rights discourse and the commemoration in memory of victim. First I contested that because of the clear dichotomy of victims/perpetrators based on the essentialistic image of victims and the moral authority of human rights discourse, those once permitted to remain comfortably inside the category of victims can enjoy the environment of immunity. After I argued the nature of commemoration, I contested that the commemoration of the victims reinforced the image of victimhood and thus was utilized as a political tool to escape from the responsibilities of the past atrocities. As a case study, I have referred the case of Japan, where people commemorate in memory of the Atomic bomb dropping in Hiroshima and the case of Rwanda, where people commemorate the 1994 genocide. Although it is impossible to fully compare and analyze two distinct cases of Japan and Rwanda, by using two examples, which entail commemorations after historic national tragedies, I have tried to argue how victimhood based on human rights discourse can efface the face of perpetrator, and how commemoration involves in this transformation. In conclusion, I have contested that the commemoration based on the victimhood of the human rights discourse is used as a political tool to escape from the responsibilities of the past atrocities and thus hampers peacebuilding.

As that of Japan and Rwanda describe, commemoration may enhance collective identity, thus contribute to group cohesion. However, we also need to note that the commemoration in memory of the victims illustrated in victim narratives of human rights discourse with dichotomy of victims/perpetrators and the moral authority based on the essentialistic image of victims, has a possibility to produce grievances of people who have suffered by victim's atrocities and thus hamper peacebuilding in the post-conflict era. In other words, commemorations are judged to be among the most divisive of state policies and they have been considered as symbolic violence.

George Orwell says in his book, *1984*, "whoever controls the past controls the future; whoever controls the present, controls the past."[63] Thus, although there is no cookie-cutter model for post-conflict peacebuilding, or no standard way to acknowledge victimhood, in order not for our memories to be shoved 'down the memory hole' through commemoration with legitimacy, we should ask ourselves the very nature of and the subject of commemoration at all times.

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[63] George Orwell, *1984* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2004), p.309

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   Available at: http://www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/boc28e.pdf

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# The People's Process in Afghanistan: Enhancing Local Governance for Peacebuilding

## Yoshiko Ogawa

### 1. Peacebuilding in Afghanistan after 2001: Shift to Bottom-up, Community-based Approach

For peacebuilding in Afghanistan, rural development has been a critical issue for historical and political reasons. Recent history of Afghanistan is characterised with power struggles between central authorities' attempts for social change and local opposition as well as among local powerholders. Modernization efforts, which started in the early 20th century, were followed by prolonged conflicts under the communist regime after the Soviet invasion in1979, the struggle to liberate the country carried out by the Mujahedeen forces, and the period of Taliban rule. The division between urban elites and ordinary Afghans, especially rural population, and entrenched mistrust of the central government prevail, which makes inclusive social development a critical component of social stabilization and peacebuilding.[1,2]

After the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, financial and technical assistance from foreign donors poured into the country. Development work has been undertaken from the national level to communities in remote and isolated areas. Despite the progress made on many fronts, such as that in education and health sectors, numerous challenges remain. Weak governance mechanisms, widespread corruption and limited access to basic services are sources of disillusion and frustration among Afghan people. Ethnic and tribal divisions remain strong and engender political instability from the national politics to village social relationships. A weakened social fabric, insecurity and profound economic hardship, especially on the part of Afghan women, all have affected the pace of development work at the community level.

Governance and peacebuilding of a fragile country have increasingly drawn attention of international communities as demonstrated in the increase in the number of peace-keeping operations and state-building support undertaken by UN and the international community.[3] However, nation-wide governance support for state-building and peacebuilding efforts tend to focus on the central level: development of central government's capacity and national level reconciliation with pre-determined agenda of foreign powers, guided by supply-driven processes.[4] Top-down, authoritative approaches

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[1] I.W. Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens: Local Participation in the National Solidarity Programme* (Kabul: AREU, 2004)
[2] O. Zakhilwal and J.M. Thomas, *Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace? The Role of Rural Development in Peace-Building,* (Working paper, November 2005, "What Kind of Peace is Possible?" project), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.282&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Last retrieved on 5 May 2017)
[3] UNDP, *Governance for Peace* (New York: UNDP, 2012)
[4] A. Suhrke, *When More is Less: The International project in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011)

to peacebuilding often ignore on-the-ground dynamics and local concepts and contexts of peace.[5,6,7] In Afghanistan, the grandiose peacebuilding and state-building project, seeking visible results in short-term, turned out ineffective and even counter-productive.[8,9] A bottom-up, inclusive approach has emerged as alternative or complement to the top-down approach to peacebuilding. A bottom-up approach is an indispensable element of national peacebuilding to cater for local specific causes and contexts of conflicts,[10,11] counting on local knowledge on root causes of conflicts and solution and communities' resilience which provides "survival and coping mechanisms for insecurity and fragility".[12] Given that recovery in a post-conflict situation is a long-term process, engagement of citizen in a democratic development process should start at the earliest stage of peacebuilding.[13]

## 2. National Solidarity Programme

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a flagship national programme of Afghanistan, started in 2003 by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), funded by the World Bank and a multi-donor trust fund, aims at delivery of common goods as well as rebuilding of local governance. When the legitimacy of the transitional government in the eyes of the rural population was at high stake, NSP was formulated to enhance community-level governance by strengthening communities' capacity for project management, and improve community infrastructure for better access to social services. Together with involvement of local authorities in this process, it is expected to enhance local governance, "a two-way process of interaction, mediation and action"[14] between citizens and local authorities. Under the programme, communities are mobilized to form a local decision-making institution called Community Development Council (CDC), elected by community members by secret ballot. CDCs, in consultation with community members, draw a Community Development Plan, prioritize development projects, submit proposals to MRRD for funding, and implement projects on their own. A community with minimum 25 families receives funds of USD 200 per family. This can make the government visible and accountable to the rural population. For NSP implementation, MRRD contracts with Facilitating Partners (FPs) composed of international and local

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[5]  J. Chopra and T. Hohe, 'Participatory Intervention', Global Governance, 10 (2004), pp.289-305

[6]  S. Campbell, 'Constructing Top-down as Bottom-up: The Governmental Co-option of Peacebuilding "From Below"', *vis-à-vis: Explorations in Anthropology*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2011), pp.39-56

[7]  S. Autesserre, 'Constructing Peace: Collective Understanding of Peace, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding' (English version of "Cistruire la Paix: Conceptions Collective de son Etablissement, de son Maintein et de sa Consolidation"), *Critique internationale*, 51 (2011), pp.153-167)

[8]  Suhrke, 'When More is Less'

[9]  J. Stephenson, R. McCall and A. Simoians, 'Not in Our Image: The Challenges of Effective Peace-building', *Prism,* Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012), pp.123-132

[10]  M. Waldman, *Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: A Case for a National Strategy* (London: Oxfam International, 2008)

[11]  T. Donais, 'Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes', *Peace & Change*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2009), pp.3-26

[12]  H. Haider, *Community-based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict-affected and Fragile Contexts*, GSDRC Issues Paper (Birmingham UK: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, 2009), p.4

[13]  F. Gatlung and M. Tinsé, 'A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2009), pp.93-107

[14]  UNDP, *Governance*, p.54

NGOs and one UN agency. As of June 2016, NSP has mobilized over 35,000 communities[15] out of estimated total number of more than 42,000 villages[16] across Afghanistan. The process is facilitated by the following five steps: (1) community mobilization, (2) election of CDC, (3) Community Development Planning and submission of a proposal, (4) project implementation, and (5) monitoring and evaluation.

As a widely-publicized exemplar of successful community driven development programmes,[17] NSP has been the subject of many reports and research papers. Many of them show positive outcomes in local governance and peacebuilding. These include perception of increased community solidarity, improved visibility of the government and the faith in the government system,[18] and enhanced capacity of communities through "establishment of legitimate form of local governance".[19,20] An inclusive and democratic way of local processes is especially important for building and enhancing good governance when the national government is weak and its service delivery is insufficient. It helps to find indigenous solutions for the lack of services, in order to benefit people equally. At the same time, it helps communities to claim their rights and make the national government accountable for its own actions. An oftentimes cited indication of local population's commitment and responsibility to community-driven development is that in Afghanistan schools built by the NSP are less likely to be targeted and destructed by Taliban compared to schools built by other aid projects or those in communities without NSP presence.[21] However, NSP implementation has not been without problems. The two most contentious issues in the NSP process are related to CDC's roles in relation to the local power structure and women's participation in local decision-making.[22,23]

CDCs are established primarily to manage the community projects; however, it also aims to enhance community solidarity and capacity through democratic election of representatives, who are to represent voices of community members including the vulnerable and powerless. Traditionally, *shura* (or *jirga*, a traditional council of elders in communities) has played a community decision-making role in the Afghan society, though its functions and power vary from community to community due to socio-cultural variance and social and demographic changes. Some communities are dominated by local powerholders, who may be from wealthy families, warlords, or respected lineages.[24] Establishment of CDCs could be threatening to these existing powerholders. There are cases of power struggles between

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[15] NSP/MRRD, Monthly Program Report (21st May to 20th June 2016), http://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=28 (Last retrieved 5 May 2017)

[16] NSP/MRRD, NSP definitions (2012), http://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=15 (Last retrieved on 5 May 2017)

[17] R. Zoellick, 'The Key to Rebuilding Afghanistan', *Washington Post* (22 August 2008)

[18] A. Beath, F. Christia and R. Enikolopov, *Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme: Final Report,* July 1 2013, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/411061468186864557/pdf/811070WP0P11600Box0379828B00PUBLIC0.pdf (Last retrieved on 5 May 2017)

[19] S. Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation Report of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP),* Afghanistan, May 2006 (York: Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, The University of York and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006), p.18

[20] J.A. Nagl, A.M. Exum and A.A. Humayun, *A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Program, Policy Brief,* Center for New American Security (March 2009)

[21] *Washington Monthly,* 'The Schools The Taliban Won't Torch' (December 2007)

[22] Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens*

[23] P. Kakar, *Fine-Tuning the NSP: Discussions of Problems and Solutions with Facilitating Partner* (Kabul: AREU, 2005)

[24] Kakar, *Fine-Tuning*

community elites when they cannot agree on the use of project resources, or a traditional *shura* feels marginalized by changes in local governance, which can undermine implementation of the programme as well as community stability.[25,26] At times, CDCs' legitimacy as a local decision-making institution is questioned and CDCs are even blamed for corruption and renewed instability.[27,28,29]

Another target of criticism is women's participation.[30,31] In Afghanistan, cultural barriers restrict women's mobility and participation in public affairs though to a varied extent in different communities. Therefore, women's participation in the NSP process has also been problematic. During the efforts to promote gender equality and women's participation, 'gender' tends to be understood as women only empowerment and runs the risk to be regarded as a foreign imposed concept[32] and so does NSP's attempts for inclusion of women.[33]

Each Facilitating Partner (FP) strived for figuring out ways to facilitate community mobilization while dealing with customary local institutions and powerholders. As a result, CDCs take varying composition and functions according to their social environment.[34,35,36,37] In some cases, existing powerholders were integrated into a CDC. In some other cases, a traditional *shura* and a CDC fulfil separate functions; while a CDC is responsible for development activities, *shura* takes responsibility for decision-making on other community matters. CDCs could complement "the traditional *shuras*' local governance in general, while introducing welcomed values such as transparency, accountability and representative leadership".[38] Yet, there are CDCs which expands their role to include wider community decision-making as a local institution representing the whole community and resolve community conflicts.[39,40] Instances are reported, in which CDCs resolved tribal, clan and familial tensions where other local authorities proved ineffective.[41,42]

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[25] Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens*

[26] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*

[27] Such short-term instability resulting from social change is inevitable. Rather, how to control and balance power is the issue (UNDP, *Governance*, p.24).

[28] J. Brick, *The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan*, paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Central Eurasian Studies Society (Washington, DC, September 2008)

[29] N. Chwalisz, *We think therefore we do: How assumptions held by statebuilders determine the statebuilding effort in Afghanistan*, MA thesis (Utrecht University, 2011)

[30] Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens*

[31] Waldman, *Community Peacebuilding*

[32] L. Abirafeh, *Lessons from Gender Focused International Aid in Post-Conflict Afghanistan...Learned?* (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2005), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02978.pdf (Last retrieved on 5 May 2017)

[33] ACTED, *Transition Strategy and Cycle 2+ Communities: A Study of NSP, March-May 2007* (Kabul: ACTED, 2007)

[34] Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens*

[35] Kakar, *Fine-Tuning*

[36] ACTED, *Transition Strategy*

[37] K. Maynard, *The Role of Culture, Islam and Tradition in Community Driven Reconstruction: A Study on the IRC's Approach to Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme* (Kabul: The International Rescue Committee, 2007)

[38] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*, p.45

[39] Kakar, *Fine-Tuning*

[40] Zakhilwal and Thomas, *Afghanistan*

[41] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*

[42] ACTED, *Transition Strategy*

Amelioration of ethnic tension between communities as a result of NSP is also reported.[43] Different ethnic groups cooperated for joint projects, which facilitated inter-community communication and cooperation. There are also examples of multi-ethnic CDCs. Other conflict resolution cases through NSP process range from those between families to between armed groups. There is evidence of enhanced solidarity between villages where joint projects had pulled people together based on tangible incentives.[44]

Similarly, as CDC establishment and inclusion of women in the development process are a required step before submission of a project proposal for NSP funding, FPs have to find ways to get community's consensus to set up a CDC with women involvement as well. They negotiated and employed flexibility according to the local context of each community, which resulted in a variety of forms of CDCs such as mixed CDCs and women-only CDCs. Even when mixed CDCs are formed, some have meetings with men and women sitting together, others have separate discussions. Nonetheless, to a varying extent, NSP created "a forum for discussion" for women on their priority issues such as health, domestic violence and literacy "that women could not discuss before".[45]

These diverse forms of on-the-ground interventions leads to the understanding that, in Afghanistan, where geography, ethnicity and conflict history form a mosaic of social and cultural practices, adaption and application of any methods of social engineering need detailed understanding and intimate knowledge of the specific contexts.[46] Especially because it is related to socially and culturally sensitive issues of power shifting and women's participation in public domain, facilitation of CDC formation and women's participation requires FP's in-depth knowledge about the social relations and practices within a particular community.[47,48] There is no one-size-fits-all strategy in promoting community peacebuilding.

As for mobilization of communities, capacity development of CDCs and facilitation of the NSP process, precedent studies have noted that critical roles FPs play.[49,50,51] FPs mobilize, train and provide technical support to the communities. Facilitation and technical skills are determining factors for successful election and project management.[52] Facilitation is not only technical but also relational. The relation of communities with FPs affects the communities' perception towards a CDC as well as NSP.[53] All FPs interviewed in an evaluation study said that it was not possible to obtain communities' genuine participation without trust of the community in FPs, which is hard to win.[54]

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[43] ACTED, *Transition Strategy*
[44] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*
[45] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*, p.59
[46] Suhrke, *When More is Less*
[47] Abirafeh, *Lessons*
[48] Y. Torabi, *Assessing the NSP: The Role of Accountability in Reconstruction* (Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2007)
[49] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*
[50] ACTED, *Transition Strategy*
[51] H. Nixon, *The Changing Face of Local Governance? Community Development Councils in Afghanistan* (Kabul: AREU, 2008)
[52] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*, p.53
[53] Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens*
[54] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*

The capacity levels of all FPs to implement NSP, however, are mixed.[55,56]  The evaluation report of NSP in 2006 and an assessment on FPs in 2004[57] repeatedly mention that expertise of long serving organization with experience and knowledge of Afghan communities, "with a proven track record of managing community development in different contexts",[58] was the quality necessary for FPs. While most of the FPs has been working long time in Afghanistan, several of them are more experienced in community mobilization, economic development, gender, and peacebuilding. The report recommends FPs should learn from such experienced organizations.[59]

In fact, NSP developed a training manual and took training of FPs as an integral part of the programme. Training guidelines were developed and utilized by FPs. That helps FP staff understand their roles in the development process as a catalyst.[60] However, there was not adequate time for capacity development of FPs and government staff involved in facilitation and implementation of NSP.[61] Reports of cases of inappropriate facilitation show that not all FP staff and its local partners had full understanding of the programme.[62]


## 3. UN-Habitat and People's Process

The United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-Habitat, has been one of the FPs since the beginning of NSP. UN-Habitat is a United Nations agency to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all. In addition to its normative work on human settlements, UN-Habitat runs technical cooperation programmes and projects in about 70 countries. UN-Habitat has been working continuously in Afghanistan since 1992. Even during the period of the Taliban rule, UN-Habitat carried out community development work in a discreet and low-key manner, enlisting its network of supporters at the community level.[63] In 1995, UN-Habitat began Community Forum Programme in Mazar-e-Sharif, a provincial capital of Balkh. This initiative was replicated in urban areas of four other provinces and rural areas of two provinces by mid-1999. Community Forums, with support of social organizers of UN-Habitat, addressed needs identified by community members and took action for the common good. Their activities ranged from literacy projects to income generation. In particular, women social organizers assisted widows, who were in extreme adversity, inhibited from going outside of their homes unaccompanied. Many lacked a regular source of income. The project protected these women from becoming completely destitute, and helped them to earn modest amounts of money from income generation activities. The work of social organizers required subtle and delicate interaction with Taliban officials and mullahs at the

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[55] Zakhilwal and Thomas, *Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace?*
[56] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*
[57] *Altai Consulting Assessment of NSP Facilitating Partners, Common Final Report II* (Kabul: Altai, 2004), cited in Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*
[58] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*, p.54
[59] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*
[60] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*
[61] Zakhilwal and Thomas, *Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace?*
[62] Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens*
[63] G.T. Lemmon, *The Dressmaker of Khair Khana: Five Sisters, One Remarkable Family, and the Women Who Risked Everything to Keep Them Safe* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011)

central and local government levels.[64]  This community-driven approach has been extensively applied by UN-Habitat and developed into the People's Process, in which communities make their own development plans to propose to submit to a funding source, and then receive funds to manage themselves the projects of their choice, with facilitation and technical support of men and women social organizers. It also builds on a conviction that reconstruction starts immediately after the disaster, not following the phased stages from emergency to re-construction and development.[65]  The process consists of the following elements: community mobilization, community action planning, community contract and implementation, and monitoring.

**(1) Community Mobilization and CDC establishment**
The process starts with community mobilization. This is the very first step for the communities to take charge of their own recovery and development. Although community mobilization may require some time for communities to be able to assume responsibility for a development initiative, experience shows that the process of enhancing community solidarity eventually results in a faster and sustainable recovery and development with informed decision-making by the communities. Community members form small groups of 10 to 15 families. Two persons represent from small groups to form a Community Development Council (CDC), and elect representatives of the community by direct secret ballot or consensus. Gender consideration is taken into account; either the chairperson or the deputy should be a woman when possible. Constitutions or by-laws to clarify responsibilities and duties of each CDC member and the community are established and agreed upon by all community members. This process makes the CDC accountable to the community.

**(2) Community Action Planning and proposal development**
Community Action Planning is a process for the community organization to discuss, identify, negotiate and prioritize the needs to be addressed, and prepare a plan considering all options within the budget available. After exploring workable solutions and available resources, a detailed implementation and monitoring plan is developed. The role of social organizers is critical in this process. They have to clearly articulate the trade-offs of the different options without imposing his or her opinions. The Community Action Plan is to be presented to the entire community for their inputs and consensus.

**(3) Community Contract, Implementation and Monitoring of Community Project**
As part of the People's Process, communities as a registered entity enter into a contract for project implementation. Physical work is carried out by community members unless technical requirements are beyond their capacity. This provides them with income and skills development opportunities. The experience of project management stays within the community. That helps the community carry out more community development projects, gathering internal and external resources. The goal is to place accountability and monitoring in the hands of the community members who will benefit from the project.

The People's Process is an approach which can enhance communities' sense of ownership and trust

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[64]  Lemmon, *The Dressmaker*
[65]  UN-Habitat, *People's Process in Post-disaster and Post-conflict Recovery and Reconstruction* (Bangkok: Regional Office Asia and the Pacific, UN-Habitat, 2007)

among themselves. Awarded funds are disbursed according to the progress of the work. Throughout the process social organizers work together with the community, facilitating meetings and providing advice. This is a development methodology which puts emphasis on community members to act on their own development needs through careful planning and implementation of community projects, based on the belief in the potential, creativity, and resilience of the affected people especially when the government is weak, absent or equally affected by a natural disaster or conflict. It builds trust and accountability, and creates the preconditions for a local governance system of their own to evolve.

In other words, the methodology endeavours to nurture social capital within communities, internal ties, or bonding social capital. Social capital infers external ties of a bridging nature as well as the bonding social capital strengthening internal relations.[66] Both types of social capital bring together and create links between different levels of social groups such as families, tribes and communities. The bonding force within extended families and tribes is especially strong, providing mutual support, whereas bridging forces create and change alliances. In addition to ethnic and tribal composition, social relationships within Afghan villages are comprised of networks of relationships of marriage, social and financial transactions. Patron-client relationships are prevalent, assisting survival of the vulnerable, at the same time maintaining unequal relationships and social hierarchy.[67] Villagers develop, maintain and utilize multiple social relations among community members for social and economic survival.[68] Therefore, a community-centred methodology is not a totally new and alien concept but one that rebuilds and strengthens social relations by invigorating their functions.[69,70]

UN-Habitat has promoted the People's Process for the past over twenty years. This strategy has been used for slum upgrading programmes particularly in Asian countries. The People's Process has in addition been utilized for post-disaster and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Afghanistan, and further developed through UN-Habitat's involvement in recovery and reconstruction efforts in the region where natural disasters and prolonged conflicts are rife. The similarity of the methodology of the People's Process to that of NSP and UN-Habitat's long engagement in community development in Afghanistan qualify it taking a leading role among FPs; UN-Habitat made significant contribution to NSP implementation including development of NSP training manual.

## 4. Case Studies: Baborian CDC and Adalat Cluster CDC

This section presents two cases from urban and rural areas of Afghanistan to show how community development was facilitated in different environments. These cases were first reported to the UN-

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[66] P.S. Adler and S.X. Kwon, 'Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept', *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2002), pp.17-40
[67] P. Kantor and A. Pain, *Securing Life and Livelihood in Rural Afghanistan – The Role of Social Relationships* (Kabul: AREU, 2010)
[68] P. Kantor, *From Access to Impact: Microcredit and Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan* (Kabul: AREU, 2009)
[69] J. Turkstra and A.B. Popal, 'Peace Building in Afghanistan through Settlement Regularization', revised version of a paper presented at the 46th ISOCARP Congress 2010 (Nairobi, 2011)
[70] Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens*

Habitat staff in Kabul as successful cases in 2011, and then the author collected further information from the staff in Kabul and provinces including social organizers of UN-Habitat.

## 4.1. Baborian CDC, Nangarhar Province

Baborian is located in the northeast part of Jalalabad city, the provincial capital of Nangarhar. Baborian is a flat area with 260 houses. Much of the population fled the area during the period of the Taliban rule and took refuge in Pakistan. Now the area has a high number of returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The infrastructure was badly damaged during the war. The population, especially woman headed households, children and the differently-abled suffer problems including the lack of drinking water, the lack of secure land tenure, poor access to social services, and the lack of durable shelter. This area was considered to be an informal settlement by the municipality of Jalalabad local government. Houses were constructed haphazardly. Women had low literacy and no employable skills and there were no training opportunities.

Baborian was selected to participate in the project 'Reintegration of Returnees, IDPs through Policy, Planning and Targeted Assistance', funded by the European Union. The major aims of the project were twofold. The first was to enable vulnerable households, including returnees and IDPs, to address their immediate and pressing needs for shelter and basic services while establishing and strengthening local governance institutions to support their integration into the wider governance structure. The second was to create opportunities and remove obstacles which impeded people's investment in housing and related services. Community mobilization started in March 2010. Social organizers first met the community and religious leaders to explain the project and its activities. In order to set up a female CDC, the social organizers had to explain the male community leaders how the project would involve community women. It was not possible to form a female CDC without agreement of the whole community.

A male CDC and a female CDC were established, but the activities did not go well. Unlike rural communities, in general urban community members are not related each other and rarely have large community meetings. Most of them lived in a rented house and were not interested in investing for community development. Both men and women were not keen to attend meetings. Men were busy earning an income to support their families. Women were also busy at home. A previous experience with some NGOs that came to the community, took pictures of women and left without bringing any project, had made them suspicious. The social organizers kept trying to convince the community members and their persistence gradually changed such attitude. After almost a year the social organizers became sure that trust of the community has developed. Problems were discussed and further analysed, and then prioritized with the participation of the whole community through small and large meetings. Throughout this process, the social organizers and engineers of the project provided technical support. They assisted with planning, proposal writing, and management of community projects, and improved the local capacity to continue development work. They did not limit their work to the project activities. They acted as close friends and mediators to resolve conflicts in the community. When there was an incident of wife beating, a female social organizer went to see the wife, the CDC, and the husband. She asked the husband the reason for his beating, and used all the resources and skills at her disposal in an effort to convince him not to beat his wife again. The social organizers also

presented themselves as role models for the community, telling that the social organizers, who are just like anyone else in the community, can work with an international organization.

A woman CDC member was happy with the change in the community and drew a picture of a dove, a symbol of peace, bringing a beautiful flower to the community, on an organogram of the CDC, four to five months after the start of the community mobilization process. She was happy with the establishment of the CDC and community work, and wanted to encourage the CDC and the community members to keep working together to make their lives better, bringing their resources together. This drawing by a woman CDC member is an expression of hope and aspiration for peace, presented to the community in order to urge its member to protect and nurture the sense of peace and solidarity in the community, where social capital was weakened after hardship of the civil wars and survival, and as a result of population movement.



Figure 1: woman CDC member's drawing, an expression of hope taken by a Social Organizer of UN-Habitat (©UN-Habitat)

After completion of the community projects, a social audit was carried out, reporting to the public all expenditures, activities and results of the implemented work. The achievements of the projects reported by the social organizers include, (i) improved community infrastructure; (ii) capacity building of CDC including five women community members; (iii) registered CDC status with the municipality as a legal entity; (iv) linkage of the CDC with other government departments and NGOs; (v) enhanced ownership of the assisted project and trust and confidence among the CDC and community members; and (vi) strengthened sense of responsibility as active players in socio-economic activities. The community, now linked to the municipality as a registered entity, and with an enhanced capacity to plan and manage its own projects, can access additional support from other aid agencies and the government more easily than before. The social organizers observe that the community have a better idea about how institutions such as the government work.

This case shows facilitation of formation and operation of the CDC and the successful joint undertaking of community projects by the community and the municipality. These helped nurture intra-community trust and confidence. The social organizers facilitated the process with patience. They presented themselves as a role model in the community, and encouraged the community members to have confidence and trust. Usually social organizers need to visit (10 times at minimum) and spend time

with communities to build sufficient trust to start facilitation process.[71] In the Baborian community, it took social organizers one year to notice attitudinal changes of the community members.

## 4.2. Adalat Cluster CDC, Balkh Province

Adalat Cluster CDC (CCDC) was formed in the Nahre Shahi District of Balkh province in the Northern Afghanistan. UN-Habitat started working in the area in 2003 as an FP of NSP, and facilitated the formation of CDCs. However, it came to be understood that not all essential rural infrastructure and facilities can be constructed by an individual community's project. There are common needs of multiple communities in terms of design, planning, budget and other resources. Therefore, CDCs were clustered to undertake larger scale community projects.

In Adalat CCDC, there are five CDCs with varying size and ethnic composition. Three of them have mainly Hazara population whereas the remaining two have Pashtun and Tajik communities. The residents of this CCDC are mostly poor farmers and returnees. For many years, they have been suffering isolation and lack of basic social services. Lack of a good road network hindered attempts of development.

Facilitation of the CCDC began in March 2010 and CCDC project implementation commenced in October 2010. The first step was Community Action Planning in which all CDCs had to agree on the work plan and responsibilities of each community. However, from the beginning, one of the CDCs, Gormer CDC did not show any interest in the plan and did not attend the meetings. Gormar CDC had a historical rivalry with another CCDC member, Qizilabad CDC. This ethnic tension came to a peak during the Taliban regime when around 80 Pashtun and Hazara people in the area were killed. Since then distrust and enmity between these two communities has dominated the people. No one from Gormer and Qizilabad travelled to the other. Without agreement of all concerned communities, the project could not proceed and support from the project would not be provided. As a third party to the factions in this tension, the social organizers talked with various parts of the communities as well as elders and proved that they took no one's side and bring out the issues common to all parties.

After a series of meetings and consultations among the CCDC member communities, Gormar CDC agreed to participate in the community planning meeting. The meeting elected CCDC committee members in a transparent way. They agreed to prioritize community development projects of Adalat CCDC. The four projects included grid extensions, construction of four water reservoirs, and cluster community road improvement.

The completion of the road project made the area more accessible and safer for driving. About 3,000 person-day jobs for community members were created. Qizilabad and Gormar communities had a ceremony to officialise their renewed relationships, and now visit each other for social functions such as weddings and funerals. The residents of the rival villages have managed to put behind their 13-year-conflict in the process of joint project management. The NSP process offered an opportunity to enhance trust among the communities. It must be noted that the facilitating of the local process was supported

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[71] E-mail communication with former UN-Habitat national project manager, 13 March 2013

by knowledge about the social and cultural contexts and the trust of the community members in FP, built on their relationship since 2003.

The case from the Gormer and Qizilabad CDCs shows the People's Process's contribution to inter-community peacebuilding. The long standing sharp division and deep-seated resentment seemed impossible to reconcile at the beginning. Persistent negotiation and persuasion by neighbouring communities and the project staff made apparent the benefits of cooperation to the two communities in conflict. Elders of the communities realized the opportunity to get benefit from the project funding and helped removing fears of their villagers. Once they began interacting and working together the relationship between the two communities dramatically improved. This gave confidence to the neighbouring communities as well. Although the future course is unknown, it can be safely said that the clustering of CDCs in Adalat CCDC has created a sense of a larger 'community'.


## 5. Discussion: Community Development and Peacebuilding

### 5.1. Facilitation of the Processes

What stood out in the cases above and the literature on NSP is the complexity of and subtlety required for the facilitation of the NSP processes. These projects and programmes are not only about community infrastructure development but also about a social change. This makes facilitation by competent and knowledgeable facilitators, in this case, social organizers, indispensable. [72] Social organizers' familiarity to the area as well as their qualification and experience in facilitation are vital to win the trust of communities, which is the essential prerequisite for effective facilitation. [73] The social organizers in the above cases tried to position themselves as a trustworthy close friend, in the Baborian case, and a neutral, third party to the conflict, in the Adalat case. These requirements pose difficulty in securing an enough number of competent social organizers.

In addition to that, staff attrition, as reported by Nixon,[74] may compound the situation. In case of UN-Habitat, it has about 200 social organizers as of February 2013. Among them, 40 staff with more than 10-year experience, who used to work as a social organizer, stays with UN-Habitat. However, they are now in the higher managerial positions, not working as a social organizer. Additional 10 former staff work as a manager of other organizations. About 60 staff with less than 10 years but more than 5 years' experience works as a social organizer or a trainer. The remaining 100, half of the current social organizers are relatively new, with less than five-year experience.[75]

This clearly shows a need for continuing training of new and old staff so that the programme can retain sufficient number of capable staff on the ground.[76] Social organizers should, at minimum, have the

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[72] Campbell, 'Constructing Top-down'
[73] Brick, *The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan*
[74] Nixon, *The Changing Face of Local Governance?*
[75] E-mail communication with UN-Habitat national project manager, 4 February 2013
[76] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*

skills of facilitation, community mobilization and trust building. In order to do these tasks well, they also need to have knowledge about specific contexts – history, social, economic cultural, demographic and political contexts[77] and to be able to flexibly and aptly respond to each specific reality. Cascading training can spread the knowledge at reasonable costs but it is not always the best option especially when the skills to be trained are practical skills, adapted according to fluid contexts. Daily mentoring and on-the-job training are found to be useful in the field. Social organizers share their daily achievements and challenges with other staff to cultivate their knowledge and skills. Such accumulated tacit knowledge is an invaluable asset to the organization.[78] "Strong built-in systems of learning and monitoring, sensitivity to context and the willingness and ability to adapt are therefore critical".[79] It is a challenge to critically analyse such daily learning and systematise and institutionalise into training curriculum of the programme.[80,81]

## 5.2. Participation of Women in the Community Process

The two cases above demonstrated that the People's Process can provide an opportunity and methodology to initiate interaction, deepen mutual understanding, and consolidate social capital of community members. The Baborian case presents enhanced 'bonding' social capital and the Adalat case 'bridging' social capital. Community development work using the People's Process established clear and agreed upon procedures. Transparency of decision-making processes and resulting trust in the system are vital ingredients for good governance. Experiences of successful management of community projects under the guidance of project staff brought confidence and trust of the community members to the CDCs.

Nonetheless, these two cases did not demonstrate a positive influence on gender relations. Women participated in discussions and decision-making for the community projects. When it comes to physical work and monitoring of construction, as well as peace-making negotiation, their participation was limited or non-existent. Though the Baborian CDC provided income generation training for women, management and monitoring of infrastructure projects were limited to men and had little to offer to women to develop their capacity. Project implementation and the episode of reconciliation in Adalat CCDC did not mention any roles played by women. This means that either no woman was involved at all, or that contribution by women was not recognized even though women may have exerted influence on CDC members or male family members at home. Certainly, community mobilization has an indispensable role as the first step to capacity development of women community members.[82] World Bank's evaluation report on NSP reports increased "acceptance of female participation in local governance and broader political participation"; however, there is only weak evidence for positive

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[77] Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, *Randomized Impact Evaluation*
[78] E-mail communication with current and former UN-Habitat national managers, 18 Jan 2013 and 8 March 2013
[79] G. Mansuri and V. Rao, *Localizing Development: Does Participation Work?* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2013), p.287
[80] Zakhilwal and Thomas, *Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace?*
[81] Mansuri and Rao, *Localizing Development*
[82] C. Echavez, *Does Women's Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference in their Lives? A Case Study in Parwan Province* (Kabul: AREU, 2010)

attitudinal changes in women's economic and social roles and status.[83] More needs to be done to involve women in community development. Training and mentoring for project management including procurement and financial management, and support to build enabling environment to participate in activities outside home are vital to promote community women's participation.[84,85]

Active presence of women social organizers with careful facilitation and negotiation skills and thorough knowledge about the local conditions is also the key to facilitate capacity building of community women.[86,87] Women social organizers can get access to women in the communities. The number of women social organizers, their training opportunity (e.g. in facilitation, negotiation, conflict resolution, and leadership) and career possibilities are the area deserving due consideration.[88]

## 6. Conclusion: local institution building and peacebuilding

In urban areas of Afghanistan, population is growing at about 5% annually due to influx of returnees, IDPs, and rural-urban migrants, new and old residents. Such a complex mixture of residents makes community development a further challenge. Nonetheless, the expression of optimism in the drawing in the Baborian CDC evinces capacity to hope, which is proved to bring distinct differences in development outcomes.[89]

In rural areas, on the other hand, historical enmity and rivalry can hinder community development. Trust building and reconciliation are badly needed at the local level as well as for the national reconciliation process to create a stable Afghan society. As shown in the case of the Adalat CCDC, facilitation based on the People's Process made cooperation between confronting communities possible. Spontaneous CCDC formation does emerge elsewhere[90] and needs to be supported.

This young local governance structure had support of the project staff, and was connected to the local government as legal entity. Improving the quality of governance in Afghanistan's cities and rural areas and increasing the capacity and accountability of local governments are critical for political stability and development. Engagement of citizens with the local government through CDCs and CCDCs are not only the basis to allow communities to build community infrastructure, but also provide a very real and immediate peace dividend. The importance of placing ordinary Afghans at the centre of local governance, with more attention to women's empowerment, cannot be overemphasized. What is needed is long-term support at the community level, buttressed by facilitators such as social organizers with skills and knowledge of detailed contexts, for enhancing governance, ensuring transparency and accountability within communities, and the building of the local governments' capacity to recognize

[83] Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, *Randomized Impact Evaluation,* pp.83-90
[84] E-mail communication with UN-Habitat national staff, 4 February 2013
[85] ACTED, *Transition Strategy*
[86] Kakar, *Fine-Tuning*
[87] Barakat, *Mid-term Evaluation*
[88] Boesen, *From Subjects to Citizens*
[89] E.B. Fiske, *Using Both Hands: Women and Education in Cambodia* (Manila: ADB, 1995)
[90] Nagl, Exum and Humayun, *A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan*

and collaborate with such local governance mechanisms.[91]


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[91] Nagl, Exum and Humayun, *A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan*

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# Community Radio as a Medium for Peace, Democracy and Development

## Masakazu Shibata

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Forward

This study undertakes an exploration of four community radio stations in Kenya in terms of the real and perceived roles they are undertaking in the public sphere of democracy building and nation building. The goal of this investigation is to examine the community of practice of the stations, and to see if they can offer a model for community radio in other parts of the Global South that continue to experience fragile democratic social institutions. The specific foci of the study are: 1) The roles that community radio station played in the 2007 Kenya general election which was marked by tribal violence, and the 2013 Kenya general election which took place under the new constitution; 2) Subjective evaluation of the media practitioners as to their personal role in democracy and peace building; 3) Perception of media authorities on their role of community radio workings in the context of nation building; and 4) Ethnographic study of the institutional culture of community radio stations and public perceptions of these stations.

### 1.2. The rationale of radio

Why does this study focus on a medium like radio, rather than the influence of new mobile media, such as texting, which played a significant role in the"Arab Spring"of 2010-11? According to the World Bank report, radio is a medium that is accessible, affordable and inclusive.[1] This makes radio a particularly effective tool in countries on the non-technology side of the digital divide. According to Carlsson, radio is accessible in rural areas that lack electricity.[2] In a survey by Media Council of Kenya, radio is identified as the "prominent source of news and information" that is widely available and accessible for Kenyan citizens.[3] Radio also serves as a platform for expressing needs, opinions and aspirations for the marginalized and develop community cohesion and solidarity.[4]

Because it is accessible and affordable, development policy players view community radio as an inclusive medium in empowering people.[5] On the occasion of World Radio Day (13 February, 2013), Director-General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova stated community radio as having power to:

"[A]ddress poverty and social exclusion at the local level and to empower marginalized rural groups,

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[1] The World Bank, *World Congress on Communication for Development* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007), p.217

[2] Carlsson, U., 'From NWICO to global governance of the information society', in Hemer, O. and Tufte, T. (eds.), *Media and Glocal Change: Rethinking communication for development* (Buenos Aires, Gothenburg: CLACSO/Nordicom, 2005), p.209

[3] Media Council of Kenya (MCK), *Status of Media in Kenya Survey Report* (Nairobi: Media Council of Kenya, 2012), p.40

[4] FAO, *Voices for change: Rural women and communication* (1999), Retrieved May 7, 2017 from http://www.fao.org/docrep/X2550E/X2550E00.htm

[5] Costa, P., 'The Growing Pains of Community Radio in Africa: Emerging lessons towards sustainability', *Nordicom Review* 33, Special Issue, 2012, p.135

young people and women. Radio is a key platform for education and for protecting local cultures and languages. It is also a powerful way to amplify the voices of young people around the world on issues that affect their lives."[6]

## 1.3. Research questions

Based on the above view of community radio, this study begins with the following research questions:
- What specific task was undertaken by community radio in the 2007 Kenya election, which was marked by violence, and the 2013 Kenya election that took place under the new constitution?
- How do practitioners of community radio see their undertaking within the context of democracy building and nation building in Kenya?
- How do media authorities (regulators and experts) perceive the role of community radio in view of Kenya media environment and in the context of democracy building and nation building?
- What is the perception of potential listeners on the community radio and its program content?

To answer these questions, research was undertaken at the following community radio stations:
- Mugambo Jwetu Radio (FM 102.3) from Tigania (central Kenya)
- Radio Mangelete (FM 89.1) from Mitito Andei (eastern Kenya)
- Sauti FM (98.1) from Asembo Bay (western Kenya)
- Mwanedu FM (96.1) from Voi (costal Kenya)

Based on this research, the study will present an analysis of the benefits of community radio programs for Communication for Development (C4D), and an exposition of knowledge gaps in the perception among media practitioners, media authorities and to lesser extent, communities themselves on the role of community radio. In this research, following key terms are used: 1) Community radio; 2) Public sphere; and 3) C4D. To clarify the theoretical basis of this thesis and to frame the background of the Kenyan media environment, following sources of information are used in this study. The next section presents reviews of pertinent literature.

## 2. Review of literature

### 2.1. Theoretical basis

#### 2.1.1 Defining community radio
The paper applies the notion of community radio from World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC), though with in mind that concept of community radio should be re-visited as societal developments dictate. The historical philosophy of community radio is to use this medium to discuss matters important to people and to exert pressure of decision-makers[7] by acting as a voice between state and commercial media that have not been served by conventional communication structures.[8] According to Kritsiotis, community is defined as "a social system of continuing interaction

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[6] UNESCO (a), *World Radio Day* (2013), Retrieved March 20, 2013 from http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/events/ prizes-and-celebrations/celebrations/international-days/world-radio-day/message-of-the-unesco-director-general/
[7] Dagron, A., *Making Waves: Stories of participatory communication for social change* (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 2001), p.329
[8] Servaes, J. and Malikhao, P., 'Participatory communication: the new paradigm?', in Hemer, O. and Tufte, T. (eds.), *Media and Glocal Change: Rethinking communication for development*. (Buenos Aires, Gothenburg: CLACSO/Nordicom, 2005), p.206

and transaction (…) between a set of actors" set by geographical boundaries or located in a particular territory.[9] Thus, community media is said to provide a fair "access" to information opportunity in facilitating their informed participation that work towards supporting community values, relationships and identity, adapting to the local knowledge and culture.[10] However, what qualifies as "participatory" in communication experience is something that is added to the original scheme of "access", where the community is at the origin of the experience, and as the means of expression, rather than for the community.[11] As Bertolt Brecht, once envisioned the possibility of radio as being the finest communication apparatus in public life based on its principle to organize its listeners as suppliers,[12] this fundamental change in the medium's relationship shifting from a view of our counterparts as development beneficiaries to that of fellow colleagues, reflect reality in a way that can induce social change and transform society.[13] John Dewey, father of modern communication philosophy expressed that community media are the only media that allow ordinary people to meaningfully participate and that "there is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication"; we cannot reach our potential without sharing information freely and fully to make use of the opportunities available in life.[14]

By reflecting on the nature of this medium, the AMARC members have reached agreement that community broadcasting is local, non-profit, and participatory with a development agenda in favor of social change that strives to democratize communication in accordance with specific social context.[15] The Kenya Information and Communications Act (2009) defines a community radio station as one which 1) is fully controlled by a non-profit entity and carried on for non-profitable purposes, 2) serves a particular community, 3) encourages members of the community served by it or persons associated with or promoting the interests of the community to participate in the selection and provision of broadcast programs, and 4) may be funded by donations, grants, sponsorships or membership fees, or by any combination of these.[16] Although, the legal definition and regulations of community radio clearly aim to encourage community consent, there still remains vagueness around community radio's identity particularly regarding community ownership as in terms of financing[17] and community of geographic coverage vis-a-vis interest.[18] In the national seminar for community media practitioners

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[9] Kritsiotis, D., 'Imagining the International Community', *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 13, n. 4., 2002, p.962, Retrieved 20 March 2013, from http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=1572&issue=32

[10] Howley, K., *Community Media: People, places, and communication technologies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.2

[11] Dagron, A., *Making Waves*, p.320

[12] Brecht, B, cited in Deane, J. Media, 'Democracy and the Public Sphere', in Hemer, O. and Tufte, T. (eds.), *Media and Glocal Change: Rethinking communication for development* (Buenos Aires, Gothenburg: CLACSO/Nordicom, 2005), p.181

[13] Cadiz, M., 'Communication for Empowerment: The practice of participatory communication in development', in Hemer, O. and Tufte, T. (eds.), *Media and Glocal Change: Rethinking communication for development* (Buenos Aires, Gothenburg: CLACSO/Nordicom, 2005) p.147

[14] Dewey, J., *Democracy and Education: Education as necessity of life* (1916), p.9, Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/852/852-h/852-h.htm#link2HCH0001

[15] AMARC Africa, *What is community radio? A resource guide* (Johannesburg: AMARC Africa and Panos Southern Africa, 1998), p.3

[16] Laws of Kenya, *The Kenya Information and Communications Act* (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney General, 2009), p.10, Retrieved March 20, 2013, from http://www.ca.go.ke/images/downloads/sector_legislation/Kenya%20Information%20Communications%20Act.pdf

[17] African Media Barometer (AMB), *Kenya 2012* (Windhoek: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012), p.50, Retrieved May 20, 2013, from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/africa-media/09404.pdf

[18] UNESCO (a), *The Way Forward for Community Radios in Kenya* (Nairobi: UNESCO, 2008), p.27

held by UNESCO in June 2008, Fredrick Mariwa, shared his experience of his community radio station being targeted for attacks, since "it was viewed to be a private radio station for the former law-maker in the region."[19] This confusion appears to be fueled by beliefs that appear to be widely held in Kenya about what a community is generally viewed to be by a particular ethnic or language group.[20] Therefore, caution needs to be exercised on the use of particular vernacular words and the picture that these words create, and media practitioners need to be conscious that language carries values in our society.[21]

## 2.1.2 Defining public sphere

The role of community radio programs in Africa generally represents an emerging public sphere in building participatory democracy and development.[22] Looking at these reports, we need to understand a deeper theoretical basis based on the idea of Habermas's notion of the public sphere stated in his book, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*:

"The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor."[23]

Hence, the public sphere is comprised of individuals whose societal interconnectedness transcends the boundaries of their personal lives in recognizing the need for common spaces to facilitate public debate on issues of common concern.[24] This entails informed discussion among citizens to exchange views on matters of importance to the common good in forming public opinion[25] that enables citizens to engage with public authority in creating a force that challenges and checks the power of the state.[26] The media also enact as a fourth estate acting as watchdogs to defend the public interest,[27] where communities see radio as not only providing them with the spaces to assert and safeguard local cultures, but also as a platform through which their rights can be advocated for and claimed, as a means of holding those who govern them to account, that are indispensable for a democratic citizenry.[28] Citizenship requires individuals to have the ability to express their own ideas based on relevant knowledge and competencies cultivated through the acquisition of reliable information to participate in the public debate and processes of opinion-formation.[29] In two recent studies, it was suggested that

[19] UNESCO (a), *The Way Forward for Community Radios in Kenya*, p.36
[20] Allen, K. and Gagliardone, I., *The Media Map Project: Kenya case study snapshot of donor support to ICTs and Media*, 2011, p.14, Retrieved May 20, 2013, from http://www.mediamapresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Kenya_web1.pdf
[21] UNESCO (a), *The Way Forward*, p.7
[22] AMARC Africa, *What is community radio?*, p.4
[23] Habermas, J., *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p.27
[24] Odugbemi, S., 'Evaluating Media Performance', in Norris, P. (ed.), *Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2010), p.8
[25] Deane, J., 'Media, Democracy and the Public Sphere', in Hemer, O. and Tufte, T. (eds.), *Media and Glocal Change: Rethinking communication for development* (Buenos Aires, Gothenburg: CLACSO/Nordicom, 2005), p.176
[26] Dahlgren, P., *Media and Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.106
[27] Deane, 'Media, Democracy and the Public Sphere', p.177
[28] Costa, 'The Growing Pain', p.135
[29] Dahlgren, *Media and Political Engagement*, p.117

community radio provides opportunity in creating a space "for self-representation"[30] that fills the existing knowledge gaps evident from mainstream media in supporting the freedom of expression and participatory democracy.[31] Community media in all its various forms are "inseparably linked to the enhancement of the civic society and civic participation" that originate and resonate from popular movements striving to attain important spaces in the public sphere.[32]

### 2.1.3 Defining C4D - A link between media, democracy and development

A significant research for C4D includes studies edited by Oscar Hemer and Thomas Tufte in *Media and Glocal Change* (2005) with contributions from numerous frontline thinkers. The idea pertaining to C4D was realized in earlier study from 1958, where communication researchers assumed that the introduction of media and certain types of educational, political, and economic information in a social system, could transform individuals and societies. Servaes underlies the essence of C4D as the sharing of knowledge aimed at reaching a consensus for action that takes into account the interests, needs and capacities of all concerned shareholders and stakeholders.[33] Cadiz explains C4D as a two-way communication interaction that aims individual and community empowerment through development paradigm.[34] The idea of using media to support in democracy building, such as through participation and empowerment, is also an aspect for C4D.[35] C4D is a complex and necessary contentious topic area. In this research, the definition of C4D is based on a view offered at the First World Congress on Communication for Development (2006), also known as the Rome Consensus:

"A social process based on dialogue using a broad range of tools and methods. It is also about seeking change at different levels including listening, building trust, sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating and learning for sustained and meaningful change."[36]

The UN also recognizes C4D as an integral part of development intervention that embraces social process at all levels of society[37] based on the fundamental principle of human rights, and that communication is imperative to any form of human activity.[38] According to Castells, a meaningful communication requires sharing and exchange of context (knowledge) between individuals and groups to identify problems and solutions, and manage conflicts.[39] In many ways, community media initiatives can be seen as a subset of C4D that have evolved within the participation paradigm, representing different voices that evolve away from state and commercial media with their own infrastructure and resources.[40] Community radio programs bring together and build a network of community of shareholders and stakeholders (including donors, implementation partners, immediate

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[30] Cammaerts, B. and Carpentier, N., *Reclaiming the media: communication rights and democratic media roles* (Bristol: Intellect, 2007), p.220

[31] Howley, *Community Media*, p.2

[32] Rennie, *Community Media: A global introduction* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), p.6

[33] Servaes and Malikhao, 'Participatory communication', p.95

[34] Cadiz, 'Communication for Empowerment', p.147

[35] Bessette, J., cited in Morris, N., 'The diffusion and participatory models. A comparative analysis', in Hemer, O. and Tufte, T. (eds.), *Media and Glocal Change. Rethinking communication for development.* (Buenos Aires, Gothenburg: CLACSO/Nordicom, 2005), p.125

[36] UNDP, *Communication for Development: Strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations* (New York. Oslo Governance Centre, 2011), p.1

[37] UNDP, *Communication for Development*, p.9

[38] The World Bank, *World Congress on Communication for Development*, p.256

[39] Castells, M., *Communication Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.54

[40] UNESCO (b), *UNESCO/WSIS Report 2013 Exploring the Evolving Mediascape. Towards updating strategies to face challenges and seize opportunities* (Paris: UNESCO, 2013), p.34

social network and broader community) to fully participate in informed debates and decision-making process that allows for local and culture specificities and perspective to be included in its communication strategies. [41] Unlike the diffusion model, which focuses on knowledge transfer principle, a participatory model is based on the concept of "community involvement and dialogue as a catalyst for individual and community empowerment."[42] It requires an understanding and respect for others that can be translated into interpersonal communication protocols, such as giving priority to active listening over expressing oneself.[43] The media combined with interpersonal skills can enhance dialogues among different stakeholders surrounding development agenda with an objective of developing and implementing activities.[44] Carpentier, through her notion of participation and public sphere, identifies community radio as a vehicle that enhances community consideration and democracy at large, thus leading to macro-participation.[45] Though community radio programs can act as a catalyst for greater engagement, C4D development practices must also have following fundamental prerequisites: 1) It needs to have accountable and transparent governance that facilitates and encourages public debate; and 2) A free and independent media system that provides communities with ownership to manage and operate their own media.[46]

## 2.2 Media environment in Kenya

### 2.2.1 Background to case study

This study is written at a critical stage in Kenya's history where the 2007 post-election violence (PEV) called for new media laws and regulations together with the propagation of 2010 Kenya constitution. The March 2013 Kenya election allowed the newly elected government to implement its devolution framework of the 2010 constitution in having greater equity and participation for local communities to address their needs, choices and constraints.[47] The basis of this research lies in the experiences of Kenya's struggle to regain stability which became evident after the 2007 PEV, with the loss of more than 1,200 lives and half a million displaced persons.[48] As political parties in Kenya fell under tribal lines above political ideology and policy, "signs of democratic recession" were witnessed in Kenya. In the Kriegler and Waki Report on 2007 Elections, the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) described the tensions existing among different tribal groups come from economic disparity, that originate from partial distribution of communal land with policies enforced by both the colonial and post-colonial systems.[49] Due to this perception, election became a public display that offers the best hope for one within the tribe to assume power and then to share resources among tribal members, thus favoring a political candidate within the tribal category.[50] The lack of institutional capacity and robust civil society also became evident, as PEV crisis also had damaged Kenya's social, infrastructural, institutional, and economic systems. These effects were not only tangible and visible as seen from human casualties and destruction of properties, but also had intangible consequences

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[41] UNDP, *Communication for Development*, p.22

[42] Morris, 'The diffusion and participatory models', p.124

[43] Cadiz, 'Communication for Empowerment', p.149

[44] Bessette, J. cited in Morris, 'The diffusion and participatory models', p.149

[45] Cammaerts and Carpentier, *Reclaiming the media*, pp.88, 107

[46] UNDP, *Communication for Development*, p.22

[47] The World Bank, *Devolution without disruption: Pathways to a successful new Kenya 2012* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2012), p.4.

[48] IRIN, In-depth: Kenya's post-election crisis. (2008), Retrieved May 20, 2013, from http://www.irinnews.org/in-depth/76116/68/kenya-s-post-election-crisis

[49] Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), *Kriegler & Waki Report on 2007 Elections* (Nairobi: Primark Ventures, 2007), pp.49, 51

[50] Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), *Kriegler & Waki Report on 2007 Elections*, p.49

resulting in the mistrust of government, destruction of social relationships, psychological trauma and pervasive fear.[51] According to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, the PEV had crippled the economy, with growth dropping from 7.1 per cent in 2007 to 1.6 per cent the following year.[52] Also the human costs of the violence can have a long-term impact on social relations and trust among tribal communities. In 2012, five years after the PEV, there are still reports estimating more than 11,000 people have been newly displaced as a result of inter-communal and resource-based violence,[53] leaving the relationship between different tribal groups still fragile, constituting to social instability.[54]

### 2.2.2 Role of media in 2007 Kenya election

Though elections are intended to legitimate and consolidate political power in a controlled, non-violent way, (whether democratically determined or not), its' aftermath has become often more violent as elections become competitive in African states having weak institutions.[55] In the case of Kenya, politics has been polarized for decades and various actors in the political arena have used this to their benefit, including through various communication systems. During the 2007 PEV, the media, in particular the local vernacular radio, have been accused of being responsible for fueling tribal hatred and violence, referring to the inflammatory speech that undermined democracy.[56] CIPEV reported that corruption in editing practice (whereby Kenyan journalists receive money to run biased stories in favor of the person who has paid the bribe), were used by political and religious leaders to transmit messages. According to the research commissioned by UNDP, vernacular radio stations fomented tribal violence through the use of "hate speech",[57] where people who are in power used to increase tensions between political parties or different tribal groupings to gain political control.[58] Such capability of the role of radio to inflame hatred and promote violence has been relatively well documented from the studies of Nazi propaganda campaigns, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and to more recent examples of Somalia.[59] The BBC World Service Trust Policy Briefing differentiated vernacular radio stations that of holding commercial licenses and those of holding community licenses.[60] Though both commercial and community radios used local vernacular languages, commercial broadcasters exhibited bias reporting linked to political parties inciting fear and hatred, while community radio emerged with great credit "in calming tension and promoting dialogue".[61] Community radio was able to balance providing an outlet for people's anger and grievances whilst discouraging violence and

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[51] Haider, H. *Community-based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict-affected and Fragile Context*. (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2009), p.4

[52] Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), *Kenya Economic Survey 2009 Highlights* (2009), p.8, Retrieved 20 May 2013, from http://www.knbs.or.ke/Economic%20Surveys/Economic%20Survey%202009.pdf

[53] IDMC. KENYA, *IDPs' significant needs remain as intercommunal violence increases* (Geneva: IDMC Publishing, 2013), p.1

[54] Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), *Norad Report 19/2009 Discussion. Political economy analysis of Kenya* (Oslo: NORAD, 2009), p.4

[55] Stremlau, N. and Price, M., *Media, Elections and Political Violence in Eastern Africa: Towards a comparative framework.* (London: University of Oxford Center for Global Communication Studies, 2009), p.5

[56] BBC World Trust Service, *The Kenyan 2007 elections and their aftermath: the role of media and communication* (Policy Briefing #1, April 2008), p.4, Retrieved May 20, 2013, from http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/kenya_policy_briefing_08.pdf

[57] IRIN, *In-depth,* Retrieved 20 May 2013, from http://www.irinnews.org/in-depth/76116/68/kenya-s-post-election-crisis

[58] African Media Barometer (AMB), *Kenya 2012*, p.7

[59] The World Bank, *Devolution without disruption*, p.10

[60] BBC World Trust Service, *The Kenyan 2007 elections,* p.7

[61] Semetko, H., 'Election Campaigns, Partisan Balance, and the News Media', in Norris, P. (ed.), *Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2010), pp.173-174

division in the most difficult of circumstances.[62]

### 2.2.3 Kenya media environment, constitutional and legal framework

These issues that were exposed in 2007 PEV also had its roots in the history of Kenya media practices and its non-existent regulatory framework; therefore, a review of this is necessary. Although Africa's first community radio station was established in 1982 at Homa Bay, Kenya,[63] it did not meet the present day organizational profile of a community radio since broadcasting was a state monopoly under the auspices of the Kenyan government.[64] In 1991, UNESCO convened a roundtable in assessing the situation of the media freedom in Africa and highlighted the importance of having free broadcasting, plurality and diversity of media as a compliment to democracy building.[65] Several meetings and international conferences have also addressed the need to ensure access to information and the right to communication as a pre-condition for empowering marginalized groups.[66] Since then, community radio has grown in Africa with the liberalization of airwaves shifting from the government control to private ownership[67] paving the way for the opening of Kenya's second (now the oldest surviving) community radio station, Radio Mangelete in 2004.[68] However, the liberalization has led not only to greater media freedom, but also to the emergence of an increasingly consumer-led and urban-centered communication system together with local language broadcast outlets. The main incentive driving the opening of these stations were neither developmental nor political, but were commercial (as opposed to community radio that has dedicated public service agenda).[69] In the Ørecomm lecture on 14 March at Malmö University, Dr. Haron Mwangi, from the Media Council of Kenya stated that "biggest constraints and threat in the media freedom is commercial interest," in having contributed to the 2007 PEV.[70] In addition, there is also a growing concern of ownership of the media outlets, not only by the market, but also by political elites, which can act against the requirement for an independent media, especially during the time of election.[71]

In order to fully understand the current media environment surrounding community radio, it is also important to highlight the changes in media policies that took place following the 2007 PEV. The Media Bill (2007) established an independent institution that regulate media programming, accredit journalists, handle complaints for the public and uphold journalists to reveal their sources.[72] The passing of the Kenya Communications Act (2009) liberalized the media sector defined conditions for

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[62] BBC World Trust Service, *The Kenyan 2007 elections,* p.7

[63] Githethwa, N., cited in Costa, P., 'The Growing Pains', p.138

[64] Iraki, F., 'Cross-media Ownership and the Monopolizing of Public Spaces in Kenya', in Mnagi, M. and Gona, G., *(Re)membering Kenya Vol 1. Identity, Culture and Freedom* (Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 2010), p.149

[65] UNESCO (b), *UNESCO/WSIS Report 2013 Exploring the Evolving Mediascape. Towards updating strategies to face challenges and seize opportunities* (Paris: UNESCO, 2013), pp.15, 34, 62

[66] Carlsson, 'From NWICO to global governance, p.193

[67] Deane, 'Media, Democracy and the Public Sphere', pp.179, 181

[68] Githethwa, N., cited in Costa, P., 'The Growing Pains', p.142

[69] BBC World Trust Service, *The Kenyan 2007 elections*, p.4

[70] Ørecomm, *Guest lecture on Kenya Elections and the Media in Post-Conflict Africa* (Malmo: Centre for Communication and Glocal Change, 2013), Retrieved March 14, 2013, from http://bambuser.com/v/3440153

[71] Nyanjom, O., *Factually true, legally untrue: Political media ownership in Kenya* (Internews, November 2012), p.9, Retrieved May 20, 2013, from http://www.internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/Internews_FactuallyTrue_Legally%20Untrue-MediaOwnership_Kenya2013-01.pdf

[72] Laws of Kenya, *The Kenya Media Bill* (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney General, 2007), p.18, Retrieved May 20, 2013, from http://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/jdownloads/Media%20Laws/media_act_2007_and_rules_of_procedure..pdf

public, private and community broadcasters. [73] The constitution is explicit in its guarantee of prohibiting the state from interfering with the editorial independence of journalists for both public and private media outlets.[74] This is a significant step toward more open and free democratic society, since the Official Secrets Act during the PEV imposed ban on live broadcasts by radio and television stations.[75] This government's initiative to control the situation was misjudged by the public, which forced people to turn to unreliable sources of information.[76] In addition, the 2010 Kenya constitution is regarded to be an instrument on improving governance and underscoring these freedoms of expression, press and access to public information.[77] The Article 33 of the constitution protects freedom of expression, which extends to seek, receive or impart information or ideas with limits to: propaganda for war, incitement to violence, hate speech or advocacy of hatred that constitutes ethnic incitement and vilification of others to cause harm.[78] Though, the constitution allows Kenya to move toward a more open and free democratic society, concentrated ownership of media outlets in the hands of a few can act against this requirement.[79]

## 2.3 Quantifiable database

Further reading that influenced the author was the World Bank publication *Public Sentinel (2010)*, UNESCO IPDC study *Media Development Indicators (2008),* and *African Media Barometer Kenya (2012)* from Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, which forms the basis for the idea of democratic roles of the media systems. Due to time, financial and logistical constraints, this study is qualitative in nature. Consequently, any quantitative data referred to in this research are taken from secondary sources as a definitive study that offer quantitative analysis, otherwise stated: *Devolution without disruption (2012)* from the World Bank, *Factually True, Legally Untrue - Political Media Ownership in Kenya (2013)* from Internews, and *Status of the Media Report (2012)* by Media Council of Kenya. The paper depends on these studies of large-scale quantitative data using verifiable methodology. All of the selected secondary sources apply indicators where measurement of data was possible in order to establish reliability.

## 3. Presentation of research project

Four original qualitative research projects were undertaken from February to May 2013. The purpose of the projects was to establish a base of empirical observations of the community radio workings in Kenya. Qualitative research methods were used for all projects since one of the goals of this research was to explore the philosophical basis of community radio practice rather than to compile statistics where an extensive quantitative database already existed. Although there are currently 16 registered community radio stations in Kenya, which are non-commercial by statue,[80] due to logistical, financial and time constraints, only four were selected for this study. However, the four radio stations provide a variety of geographical representation. The limited frames of this research include the following

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[73] Laws of Kenya. *The Kenya Information and Communications Act*, p.42.

[74] Official Law Reports, *The Constitution of Kenya* (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney General, 2010), p.8, Retrieved May 20, 2013, from http://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20 Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdf

[75] African Media Barometer (AMB), *Kenya 2012*, p.16

[76] Stremlau and Price, *Media, Elections and Political Violence*, p.13

[77] African Media Barometer (AMB), *Kenya 2012*, p.7

[78] Official Law Reports, *The Constitution of Kenya*, p.26

[79] Media Council of Kenya (MCK), *Status of Media in Kenya*, p.9

[80] Nyanjom, *Factually true, legally untrue*, p.27

aspects - the role of the researcher at UNESCO, which may have tended to skew answers from some of the respondents. All of the interviews were conducted in English, which was the second language of most of the respondents. However, the research was undertaken in accountable and transparent manner and all data was recorded and transcribed. A discussion section will follow based on the findings after the presentation of each research project.

**3.1 Research project #1: Introduction and interviews with media practitioners in Kenya (February 13, 2013)**

Face-to-face interviews were conducted on the occasion of the National Forum of Community Radio in Kenya, where a wide spectrum of community radio stakeholders gathered for the World Radio Day celebration in Mtito Andei. The goal of this interview was to gain a general introduction of community radio practice in Kenya and identify key strategies among media practitioners in undertaking their media role. Station managers were the only pre-identified informants. Interviews with staff and volunteers from each radio station were conducted on a random basis. Total of 30 people were interviewed. Interview format was a 10-point questionnaire.

**Result of conducted interviews**

**Finding 1: All practitioners felt that community radio contributed to democracy and nation building in Kenya**

*"Our task is to interpret issues from national to local level. We sensitized people on the role of our representatives under the new constitution, and enabled people make informed participation and policy choices toward democracy." - Roselyn Kakinda, Personal communication, February 13, 2013*

**Finding 2: All practitioners felt that community radio fulfills local information need**

*"Providing accurate, reliable and timely information is essential when livestock epidemic is causing havoc. As a doctor, I can answer to these calls. Health issue is generally personal but there can be common questions that affect the entire community." - Timothy Mutua, Personal communication, February 13, 2013*

**Finding 3: All practitioners felt that they offer a space for dialogue, participation and sharing of knowledge**

*"We promote dialogue and debate on the major issues and people critique, comment and share ideas on our program. We also follow up on our discussion and disseminate knowledge by inviting experts to our shows." - Velice Wanyigh, Personal communication, February 13, 2013*

**Finding 4: 60% of practitioners felt that they act as watchdog holding authorities account**

*"The police was slow to act in the alleged rape case. People came to our station and we conducted our own investigation and secured an intervention for the family. When people feel deprived, they come to us."- David Thurannira, Personal communication, February 13, 2013*

*"There are many cases on ownership and division of boundaries involving ancestral and communal land. More than 300 people crowded our station when their land was grabbed. We went to the Land Office to verify their claims and started investigating from the both sides." - Timothy Mutua, Personal communication, February 13, 2013*

**Finding 5: 70% of practitioners felt that they are perceptive to the type of language being used in broadcasts**

*"We mostly use Kiswahili because our community is inter-tribal. We articulate ideas in a language that could be understood and appreciated by all." - Roselyn Kakinda, Personal communication, February 13, 2013*

**Finding 6: All practitioners have identified funding as key challenges for community radio workings**

*"Because we are non-profit, we are dependent on donations and sponsorships. Our talented staff are also poached by commercial radio, which are better paying. Financing to upgrade our transmitter is a challenge." - George Mwamodo, Personal communication, February 13, 2013*

**Finding 7: 80% of practitioners felt that ICTs are relevant to improve their program quality**

*"Audience participates through call-ins, followed by SMS and social media. Free and open source software like the Frontline SMS, improve our interaction. Though, people freely discuss their personal issues on-air, text messaging can allow them to be anonymous." - Diana Mariwa, Personal communication, February 13, 2013*

**3.2 Research project #2: Follow-up interviews with initial interviewees as to the role of their stations in the 2013 Kenya election (April 2-5, 2013)**

Follow-up telephone interviews were conducted on April 2-5, 2013. The goal of this interview was to collect additional data to mainly unfold the meaning of their undertaken initiative and define engagement practices of key practitioners in reflecting the March 2013 Kenya election. A five-point email questionnaire was sent prior to the interview. This method was mainly chosen to overcome spatial barriers that exist between Nairobi and their respective communities. Total of 5 people were interviewed.

**Result of conducted interviews**

**Finding 8: 45 % of telephone respondents felt the imminent effect from PEV 2007**

*"There were killings everywhere. Communication and movement was restricted. Shops were closed and we could not buy air time for the phones, making it difficult to verify information." - David Okoth, Personal communication, April 3, 2013*

**Finding 9: 80 % of telephone respondents felt that they were well prepared for 2013 Kenya election**

*"We organized an election desk with reporters. We also took part in trainings organized by the Media Council working in tandem with the IEBC." – George Mwamodo, Personal communication, April 3, 2013*

**Finding 10: 90 % of telephone respondents felt that their work was pivotal in the outcome of peaceful 2013 Kenya election**

*"We reached out to people and educated them on the new democratic process. For development to*

*take place, peace must be maintained. Somebody can go into violence without knowing this value, but once you realize this, then things actually start to happen." - Desmond Abidha, Personal communication, April 3, 2013*

*"We worked with experts on what devolved government would mean to the community. In the election debate, we presented different angles by having presenters take sides on imposed question and asking the audience to vote on different opinions. We should not be bias and we pacified the debate at the end of the show."- Peter Kochiel, Personal communication, April 4, 2013*

### 3.3 Research project #3: Interviews with media experts on media environment surrounding community radio workings in Kenya

Face-to-face interviews were conducted on the occasion of Regional Journalists' Convention for the celebration of World Press Freedom Day held in Nairobi, Kenya on May 3-5, 2013. The goal of this interview was to deepen the understanding of media policy and regulations, as well as on general philosophy and current view of community radios workings among the media experts in Kenya. Two representatives from the Media Council of Kenya (an independent national institution in setting media standards) were interviewed. A separate interview was conducted with the UNESCO Regional Advisor responsible for media development programs in Africa. A seven-point questionnaire was prepared and sent prior to the interview to facilitate the interviewing process.

**Result of conducted interviews**

<u>Finding 11</u>: **All respondents felt that media awareness has been greater in 2013 as compared to 2007 Kenya election, and as a result contributed to peaceful election outcome**

*"In 2007, many reporters and editors took a comprising role and failed to act independently. Media houses supported particular individuals and headlines were sensationalized for commercial profit. Little time was allocated for fact-finding. However, in the 2013 election, the media acted more professionally and what would cause chaos was filtered through self-regulation." - Victor Bwire, Personal communication, May 3, 2013*

<u>Finding 12</u>: **Specific undertaking by media regulators in preparing for the 2013 Kenya election**

*"Election reporting guideline was developed. We accredited all journalists where they had to present a certificate from the employer, an academic record, and a portfolio of their work. We also scaled up our monitoring capacity. A complaint commission was also strengthened to handle cases related to election reporting. Furthermore, Data Protection Bill and Access to Information Bill are under review to enhance media professionalism." - Victor Bwire, Personal communication, May 3, 2013*

<u>Finding 13</u>: **All respondents felt that a legal, policy and regulatory framework contribute to democracy building**

*"A regulatory framework is needed to safeguard media freedom and freedom of expression. Media freedom involves media actors consisting of public, private and community broadcasters abiding to code of ethics. Within the broader framework of the media sector, they must adhere to ethical principle and standard because they are part of a powerful vehicle. This is especially significant with the culture of devolution that is currently happening in Africa. However, freedom of speech incorporates elements such as citizens' rights to express one's point of view, where citizens also have responsibilities." - Jaco du Toit, Personal communication, May 4, 2013*

**Finding 14: All respondents felt that community radio plays an important role in the Kenya's development context and democracy building**

*"The Vision 2030 (Kenya development framework) entails 3 pillars comprising of political, economic, and social interventions. The media is expected to carry out its business to inform the public on issues surrounding these agenda. Community media as in terms of local development is significant, because the agenda is set by the community on issues that people feel that are their own. If there are only few media outlets representing these voices, it means that most dominant media will have their ideas flowing out into the society, thus jeopardizing the diversity of ideas and opinions from the people. Democracy, integration and peace come from diversity and plurality of the media. Everyone in a society must be given an opportunity to speak out in practicing democracy constituting to larger democratic life." - Haron Mwangi, Personal communication, May 3, 2013*

**Finding 15: Challenges that were identified by respondents of community radio workings in Kenya.**

*"We look for their capacity to deliver sustained quality of service for the communities they serve. Issues with community radio sometimes imply people practicing journalism without proper trainings. Since we only conduct trainings for journalists who are accredited, volunteers working at the community radio sometimes miss out on this opportunity. Therefore, they might need special considerations." - Victor Bwire, Personal communication, May 3, 2013*

**Finding 16: Community radio reinforcing their community identity**

*"Community radio provides a voice to people as an alternative to state and commercial broadcasters that have vested interest. It generates local content in a local language that supports community values and relationships. When this is made available, people's identities are reinforced." - Jaco du Toit, Personal communication, May 4, 2013*

**3.4 Research project #4: Interviews undertaken with communities and ethnographic observations at the site of four community radio stations (May 21-31, 2013)**

Face-to-face interviews were conducted from May 21-31, 2013 at the communities of four community radio stations. The goal of this interview was to see if there is substantive difference in understanding of community radio workings between media stakeholders vis-a-vis general public. The aim of this research was to compare initial views expressed by media stakeholders in the research project #1, #2 and #3. All informants were non-preselected. Format of interview was a seven-point questionnaire. This interview method was chosen due to literacy constraints and it seemed a better way to extract information. In addition, ethnographic observation was used in giving account for first-hand "objective" knowledge to develop a worldview of community radio workings. The core aim of this study was to capture the institutional culture of community radio, linking with community life and unique perspective of the informants through a real-life cultural participation. A total of 20 people were interviewed for this research. English-speaking individuals from local communities assisted in the interview process with the interpretation.

**Result of conducted interviews**

**Finding 17: 75 % of the respondents had positive response of their view on community radio**

*"Today, my friend was calling the station to ask about her symptoms. They educate us on matters of*

*health nutrition and family planning." - Mourice Atieno, Personal Communication, May 30, 2013*

**Finding 18: 5 % of the respondents had negative response of their view on community radio**

*"Political news was focused on a particular Members of Parliament who had inaugurated the station. When I contested about his policy, I was cut off from the air. You couldn't talk against the former MP." - James Araya, Personal communication, May 28, 2013*

**Finding 19: 20 % of the respondents were found not listening to community radio**

*"What they discuss is very local and their (geographical) broadcasting coverage is limited." - Edwin Kirimi, Personal communication, May 28, 2013*

**Finding 20: Examples of information obtained from the community radio**

*"We learn about our culture and tradition that you never find in books, and on issues that affect our lives." - Jonnes Muuo, Personal communication, May 30, 2013*

**Finding 21: 65 % of the respondents had or knew someone that had contacted the community radio**

*"I've called-in to see how I could convince my husband to get tested for HIV. Then, a man listening to the radio called-in and shared his experience and the benefits about testing for HIV." - Velice Waithira, Personal communication, May 23, 2013*

**Result of ethnographic observations (of institutional culture of community radio and community workings)**

**Finding 22: Observation of Mtito Andei, Radio Mangelete (May 21-22, 2013)**

Kilimanjaro was seen in the distance from the station. Ester Bole, wearing a black suit was conducting a live talk show, when I entered the studio. She was with Sabrina Paul, a local youth group member. They discussed about the new entrepreneurship project that was being launched, and on employment, education and trainings. Bernard Kilonzo, a volunteer DJ, was preparing a play list in the next room, mostly on reggae and traditional music. Substantial music collection was organized in the room. All presenters used the studio mobile phone to gather data for audience engagement. Studio was spacious and well kept, and had modern broadcasting and recording equipment. Lunch was being prepared in the outdoor kitchen using all local ingredients. Since the work of the station was linked directly to community life, I decided to take a walk to immediate community to meet with potential listeners. There was a primary school nearby and pupils were taking exams in the school yard. Radio was tuned to Radio Mangelete at the school principal's office. Many elders were also gathered listening to the radio resting by tree.

**Finding 23: Observation of Voi, Mwanedu FM (May 22-24, 2013)**

The station was located in the town center on the fourth floor of an apartment building. Mwanedu FM was hosting the newly elected county governor when I arrived. Visitors had to be squeezed inside the station. The county executive committee members who were also visiting and they took part in the live talk show. Solomon Muingi and Anthony Arusi, the two radio presenters, reviewed newspapers and browsed online media sites. They took notes to prepare for their afternoon program. Solomon sent text

messages to his listenership to decide on the discussion topic, and the feedback from the audience was incorporated into the design of the program. There was a constant audience engagement involving men and women listeners, as discussion took place on the role of men in family building. I decided to take a walk to meet with potential audience. The streets were busy with people. Most small shop keepers had their radio turned on.

### Finding 24: Observation of Tigania, Mugambo Jwetu Radio (May 27-29, 2013)

By six o'clock, Timothy Mutua and David Thuranira, were already airing their morning show with prayers, community greetings and news content. Call-ins came from listeners to share events, funerals and birthday information. Timothy covered local issues pertaining to land rights and agriculture. Around noon, the station became busy as villagers came to make photocopies of public documents, while others used the computers for Internet. In the afternoon, the station was crowded with children who came to play radio skits. Carol Kianira, a presenter for the youth empowerment program, was preparing for her evening show based on audience feedback received from the previous day. One audience came to speak in her show and Carol acted as a moderator. Electricity went off for one hour but it did not affect the broadcast. Mugambo Jwetu had a casual working environment where staff and management at times told jokes to each other. I decided to take a walk around the station to meet with potential audience. Primary and secondary schools were located next to the station. Youth were engaged with sports and some had headsets listening to radio.

### Finding 25: Observation of Asembo Bay, Sauti FM (May 29-31, 2013)

Jared Onyango, a presenter, checked emails and SMS for listener feedback. Frontline SMS was used to distribute and collect information from their audience. Staff meeting took place to discuss strategies on how best to incorporate Frontline SMS into the design of their program. Presenters were fully aware about what others were doing in the show. They discussed in small groups about political and social issues relevant to their program. They also archived newspaper articles on a daily basis. Not all stories were aired as the decision lay solely with the editor and some stories also required further research. Correspondents were in frequent communication with the editor. The facility and equipment were well maintained. There was a power shortage for forty-five minutes. Since the station manager was on mission, Desmond Abidha took the managing role. There was teamwork and a sense of shared value and responsibility. Members from women and church groups came to visit the station in the afternoon to promote their local activities on the radio. I decided to take a walk around the station towards Lake Victoria, I met a group of youth resting under the tree, listening to the radio on their mobile phone.

## 4. Discussion of result

The analysis of the result offer answers to the original research questions based on qualitative data collected through four original pieces of the research project, together with selected quantifiable database as indicated previously.

Following is a table of significant exposition of the perception among media regulators, practitioners and audiences on the role of community radio in Kenya. No major knowledge gap was found among the media practitioners, media regulators and experts, and potential listeners.

| Practitioners' views on community radio | Community perception on community radio | Media regulators' and experts' views on community radio |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Educating and informing people on their roles as Kenyan citizen by interpreting issues from national and local level in a language that they understand, in particular on the new constitution and devolution framework<br><br>2. Providing spaces for dialogue and participation that enhances community consideration and in making informed decisions | 1. Providing information on issues that affect their lives in a language that they understand<br><br>2. Providing spaces to voice and share their opinions on personal and communal issues<br><br>3. A place where they can advocate for and to claim, as a means of holding those who govern them account when they feel that they are deprived | 1. Adding to diversity and plurality of the media constituting to larger democratic life<br><br>2. A medium where the agenda is set by the local communities that practice democratic principles on a smaller scale, that are significant with the culture of devolution that is currently taking place in Africa<br><br>3. Reinforcing people's identity through local content production in a language the they understand and appreciate |

| Media practitioners<br><br>Total Respondents: 30 | Community members<br>Total Respondents: 20<br>(16) were radio listeners | Media regulators and experts<br><br>Total Respondents: 3 |
|---|---|---|
| Finding 1: All felt community radio contribute to democracy and nation building in Kenya<br><br>Finding 2: All felt community radio provide local services fulfilling local information need<br><br>Finding 3: All felt community radio offer a space for dialogue, participation and sharing of knowledge<br><br>Finding 4: 60% of practitioners felt that they acted as watchdog holding authorities account<br><br>Finding 5: 70% felt sensitive to language that they use in broadcasts<br>Finding 6: All perceived funding as a key challenge<br><br>Finding 7: 80% felt ICTs are relevant to improve their program quality<br><br>Finding 8: 45% felt the imminent effect from 2007 PEV | Finding 17: 75% had positive view on community radio<br><br>Finding 20: 85% identified community radio as their main source of news and information<br><br>Finding 21: 65% had or knew someone that had contacted the community radio | Finding 11: All felt that media awareness was much greater in 2013 than in 2007, which contributed to the outcome of peaceful 2013 Kenya election<br><br>Finding 13: All felt legal, policy and regulatory framework are essential to democracy building and nation building<br><br>Finding 14: All felt community radio plays an important role in Kenya's development and democracy building |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| <u>Finding 9:</u> 80% felt that they were well prepared for 2013 Kenya election<br><br><u>Finding 10:</u> 90% felt community radio played pivotal role in the outcome of peaceful 2013 Kenya election | | |

*Source: the author, based on the research projects #1-4*

#### 4.1 What was the specific role of community radio in the 2007 Kenya election marked by violence and 2013 Kenya election that took place under the new constitution?

Based on the research conducted for this study and especially the interviews in Project 1 and 2 (Section 3.1, 3.2), it can be concluded that community radio played a pivotal role in the success of the 2013 general election both by contributing to the larger national debate on the devolution framework and by acting as a tool to a peaceful election outcome.

In preparing for 2013 election, community radio worked to educate and sensitize their communities on the new constitution especially relating to taking part in informed decisions making process. One quote from the Sauti FM radio presenter (Section 3.2: Finding 9) is representative of the work done by many practitioners. (Section 3.1, 3.2)

Also in the area of democracy building, community radio stations developed outreach policies to avoid ethnic violence that marred the 2007 election process. A quote from radio presenter, Roselyn Kakinda, is representative of the work done other stations that undertook this challenge. (Section 3.1: Finding 5)

Without reliable information, citizen would not be able to use their power effectively at time of election, nor would they be aware of the problems and issues that need active consideration beyond voting. In considering the positive role of community radio in the 2013 elections in Kenya, I suggest that the role of community radio in elections in other Sub-Saharan African nations may be an area for further research, and this will be addressed in the concluding section.

#### 4.2 How do practitioners of community radio see their undertaking within the context of democracy building and nation building?

Based on conducted research for this study, and especially the interviews in Project 1 and 2 (Section 3.1, 3.2), community radio linked relevant knowledge to empower citizens by offering an on-air forum for debate to represent diversity of opinions on election topics. One quote from Sauti FM radio presenter (Section 3.2: Finding 10) is representative of the work done by many practitioners. (Section 3.1)
Of similar importance for quality of the public debate is the way in which the community radio present and frame in setting the political issue and link their local agenda to larger citizen engagement of civic life. George Mwamodo, radio station manager from Mwanedu FM is representative of the work done by other stations that undertook this challenge. (Section3.1: Finding 1)

As discussed previously in Section 2, typical challenge to successful devolution include limited capacity, poor information systems, weak checks and balances, and often poorly organized civil

society.[81]  Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that community radio stations in Kenya fills this local space by framing information relevant to local communities. Through such a process, it strengthens the development of informed public opinion relevant to Kenya's devolution framework, thus contribute to the democracy building, nation building at large and citizen participation in governance.

**4.3 How does media regulators and expert perceive the role of community radio in view of Kenya media environment and in the context of democracy building and nation building in Kenya?**

Based on research conducted for this study, and especially the interviews in Project 3 (Section 3.3), the overall media regulators and media experts saw community radio as a valuable addition to the Kenya media environment augmenting to a diverse mix of media actors.

As discussed previously in Section 2, a free, diverse and plural media sector represents wide array of public opinions that constitutes to larger democratic life.[82]  By studying the initiatives taken by media regulators, they were found not only to be concerned with the national debate on Kenya media environment (pertaining to legal policy framework to promote free, plural and diverse media landscape), but also saw community radio intervention as integral part of their strategy. One quote by Dr. Haron Mwangi, Deputy Director of Media Council of Kenya, on the occasion of Regional Journalist' Convention in the celebration of World Press Freedom Day, is representative of the views shared amongst media regulators and experts. (Section 3.3: Finding 14)

Also, effective democracies require a diversity of social and political viewpoints that need to be heard across society, that are vital to forming informed public debate. Community radio can be seen not only as a media actor contributing to diverse and plural media environment, but also as a unique voice that provides equal opportunities for inclusive participation from the grassroots. One quote by Jaco Du Toit, UNESCO Media Advisor, is representative of the views shared amongst media regulators and experts. (Section 3.3: Finding 16)

The fact that community radio represents a voice from the grassroots, signifies means by which a society or a country can learn about itself in building a sense of shared values. Thus, community radio can act as a vital tool for national cohesion and solidarity. It also stresses the importance of cultural identity of local communities and participation across wide spectrum of actors at all levels (international, national, local and individual), essential for democratization.

**4.4 What is the perception of potential listeners on community radio station and its broadcast programming?**

Based on the research conducted for this study, and especially the interviews in Project 4 (Section 3.4), community radio was not only seen as source of their information and knowledge, but also as a space that facilitated interpersonal and mediated communication. One quote from the local population (Section 3.4: Finding 21) is representative of the perception by many potential listeners on the work of community radio stations. (Section 3.4)

People from the local communities consciously used community radio as a communication tool to express their opinions and concerns, and share ideas and knowledge by participating in the spaces that

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[81]  The World Bank. *Devolution without disruption*, p.4.
[82]  UNESCO (b), *UNESCO/WSIS Report 2013*, pp.15, 34, 62

community radio stations offered. People also used community radio to make outreach in one's immediate social environment, for example, family members, friends, neighbors, or colleagues, and to larger society, that allows them to see themselves as citizens who can make conscious decision on matters of personal and common concerns.

## 5. Conclusion

In concluding this study, community radio played a significant role to empower communities and promote informed participation towards democracy and nation building. In the current state of Kenyan media landscape, radio remains the most powerful, and yet the reasonable medium for rapid diffusion of messages. Radio programs are also most effective when produced with audience participation, in local languages and with consideration for cultural traditions. Furthermore, the implementation of journalism code of practice has sensitized the media and journalists on accuracy, fairness and integrity of the election reporting, in holding them accountable for their action to the public. Community radios have contributed to community cohesion and solidarity, and to the outcome of peaceful transition of power in the 2013 Kenya election.

However, further research proposals and policy considerations are implied by the findings discussed above.

1) The success of community radio in playing a key role in the 2013 Kenyan elections calls for further research on how this experience is being translated into the preparation for free, fair and credible 2017 Kenya general election (as one of the prerequisites of democratic governance), in accordance with locally owned agenda, driven by the community radio.

2) This paper also calls for more academic research in the role of community radio in public sphere development in other sub-Saharan African countries, and in communities where democracy building is still a fragile process.

3) Because community radio programs are often supported by donors to foster democracy and good governance in their strategies, there is need to be a real focus to achieve such objectives through a holistic approach to the media development. Factors such as professional skills development for ethical journalism reporting, management skill development for sustainability of community radio operation, enabling legal environment to protect freedom of speech, and media literacy education must all be addressed simultaneously. Further research is proposed to policy review as to donor funding for community radio programs.

Therefore, this study should end as it began with the observation that due to its affordability, accessibility and inclusivity, community radio offers a valuable tool for C4D and in promoting peace, democracy and development in the Global South.

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**Appendix 1: List of informants**

| Media Practitioners | Radio Mangalete | Meshack Nyamai | Station Manager |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Alfonse Kioko | Staff |
| | | Benard Kilonzo | Volunteer |
| | | Esther Mbole | Staff |
| | | Mutua Makau | Volunteer |
| | | Sabina Martin | Staff |
| | Mwanedu FM | George Mwamodo | Station Manager |
| | | Antony Arusi | Staff |
| | | Roselyn Kakinda | Staff |
| | | Solomon Muingi | Staff |
| | | Sophy Sangalia | Staff |
| | | Velice Wanyigha | Volunteer |
| | Mugambo Jwetu Radio | Reuben Mukindia | Station Manager |
| | | Carol Kianiraa | Staff |
| | | David Thuranira | Staff |
| | | Emma Kagwria | Volunteer |
| | | Frinda Makena | Staff |
| | | Timothy Mutua | Staff |
| | Sauti FM | Fredrick Mariwa | Station Manager |
| | | David Odiyo | Staff |
| | | David Okoth | Staff |
| | | Desmond Abidha | Staff |
| | | Dennice Otono | Staff |
| | | Everlyn Wahanda | Staff |
| | | Haroun Oyumbo | Staff |

| | | Jared Onyango | Staff |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Maurine Amari | Volunteer |
| | | Peter Kochiel | Staff |
| | | Rhoda Adala | Volunteer |
| | | Ruth Ochungo | Volunteer |
| Media Regulators and Experts | Media Council of Kenya | Haron Mwangi | CEO |
| | | Victor Bwire | Executive Officer |
| | UNESCO | Jaco Du Toit | Regional Advisor |
| Community Member | | Millicent Atieno | Asembo Bay |
| | | Kate Muna | Asembo Bay |
| | | Mourice Atieno | Asembo Bay |
| | | Peter Kochiel | Asembo Bay |
| | | Rhoda Adala | Asembo Bay |
| | | Aggrey Kawino | Mitito Andei |
| | | Everlyne Mumbua | Mitito Andei |
| | | Julius Mwau | Mitito Andei |
| | | Joseph Wambua | Mitito Andei |
| | | Urbanus Musumaa | Mitito Andei |
| | | Bambika Burudani | Voi |
| | | Velice Waithira | Voi |
| | | Jonnes Muuo | Voi |
| | | Morries Muendo | Voi |
| | | Pamela Kangai | Tigania |
| | | Timothy Mutua | Tigania |
| | | Edwin Kirimi | Tigania |
| | | James Araya | Tigania |
| | | Pamela Kangai | Tigania |
| | | Kate Muna | Tigania |

# Review of Peacebuilding Studies (RPS)

Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC)

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References and notes should be typed in the form of the following examples:

1. Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 51-53
2. Freedman, *Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,* p.152
3. Bruce Cumings, 'Japan and the Asian Periphery', in Melvy P.Leffler and David S. Painter (eds.) *Origins of the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 226-229
4. *New York Times,* 13 May 1987
5. Cumings, 'Japan', p. 216
6. J. P. Cornford, 'The Illusion of Decision', *British Journal of Political Science*, 4 (1974), pp. 231-43.

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